Existing and alternate policy towards the Arabs in Israel*

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Today many countries are deeply split along cultural, ethnic or racial lines. Minorities that are culturally distinctive, living in a separate community and rejecting the dominant basic ideology, constitute a potential source for disruptive conflicts. Violent strife does in fact occur frequently. The question then arises as to what policies these states adopt to keep internal tranquillity.

Theoretical framework

It is possible to classify policies towards minorities in terms of the three major ways to achieve stability in pluralistic societies. These are consensus-building, consociationalism and domination.

The policy of consensus-building is reflected in a sustained effort to do away with ethnic divisions, the weakening of primordial ties and the formation of common national culture and identity. The most important measures used to implement this option are the inculcation of shared core values, crosscutting affiliations and resource allocation according to merit. Based on the uni-cultural, uni-national ideal of the nation-state, the consensus-building policy usually takes the form of assimilation, either voluntary or imposed. Typical examples are the policies of Americanization and Russification as well as endeavours at nation-building by many new states (Eisenstadt and Stein, 1973).

In contrast, the policy of consociationalism intends to retain the ethnic division and to legitimate the ethnic cultures and identities. An attempt is made to secure political integration through crystallization of broad operative consensus, compromise in controversial issues while depoliticizing irreconcilable areas and cooperation among the ethnic elites. Rather than individual achievement, proportional group representation is practised to attain equal opportunity. Similarly, legal-cultural self-rule and sometimes territorial autonomy are granted to minorities instead of personal competition and ethnic integration. Consociationalism is carried out with considerable success in the Netherlands and Switzerland, with some headway in Canada and Belgium, but failed in Cyprus and Lebanon (Lijphart, 1977).
An alternative avenue to preserve social stability is via effective domination over the minority (Lustick, 1979). As in consociationalism, the ethnic division in culture, identity, organizations and resources is retained. However, ethnic stratification and cultural hegemony are institutionalized in lieu of consociational compromise and partnership. The majority dominates the state institutions, superimposes its culture, takes for itself a disproportionate share of resources and promotes its ethnic interests. It determines the living conditions of the minority and tends to disregard its needs. Domination relies on two mutually reinforcing mechanisms: economic dependence on the majority that deprives the minority of any independent economic base, and political control that prevents the minority from organizing itself independently and resisting the regime (van den Berghe, 1973: 965). While the minority's right to separate identity and institutions is acknowledged, institutional autonomy is withheld to avert cumulation of power. This method has proved itself with regard to blacks in the United States up until the 1960s, Catholics in Northern Ireland between the years 1921 and 1968, and the non-Amharic minority in Ethiopia for centuries. It has nevertheless failed in other periods and circumstances (e.g. the collapse of colonialism which was built upon domination).

None of these methods is universally effective for preserving internal peace. While domination is morally indefensible, it is not necessarily less efficient than consensual or consociational means. To cite but one example, South Africa has, for over a hundred years, been administering a growingly sophisticated, rigid system of domination over the non-white majority. Moreover, whenever these policies are successfully executed, they prevent social disorder but with differing costs and benefits for the minorities. In consensus-building, the minorities enjoy entering into the society, rights and power, but lose their identity. In consociationalism, they keep their separate existence, protect their interests and play a role in decision-making, but are trapped in a patchy stalemate. In domination, they are placed under control but safeguarded against persecution, bloodshed, deportation and chaos.

Reinforced by certain designs for policy analysis that are common today in the policy sciences (Greenstein and Polsby, 1975), this classification provides a handy framework for analyzing policies and policy changes towards minorities. They should, however, be defined more broadly to consist of three major components (Lockard, 1975: 246-8). The 'manifest' component includes official resolutions, laws and regulations, whereas the 'latent' one contains informal discriminatory norms or practices. The third component is policy 'by default', i.e. the unwillingness to alter a policy that is ostensibly irrelevant to the minority but is in fact discriminatory (e.g. ignoring the unemployment problem although it mainly affects the minority). Comprehensive analysis of policy towards minorities requires, therefore, an examination of official and unofficial actions as well as inactions by dominant public bodies.
The existing policy

The question of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel, within its pre-1967 borders, is typical of many plural societies, i.e. accommodation between conflicting population sections. It is understandably experienced differently by Jews and Arabs. For the Jews the issue is primarily of what Rose (1971) in his study of Northern Ireland calls 'governing without consensus'. They regard themselves as an involuntary dominant majority who have to handle a dissident (i.e. dissenting from the unwritten state constitution of Zionism) and potentially disloyal minority, while remaining within the bounds of political democracy. Jewish suspicions are further augmented by feelings of insecurity and alienation in the broader Arab region. The Arabs, on the other hand, are an involuntary nondominant minority, which encounters the impasse of what de Tocqueville (1969: 250-4), in a classic treatise on the ante-bellum United States, identifies as the 'tyranny of the majority'. This is the inability to effect a radical change in their status in the face of an organized opposition of the majority.

Underlying the problematic status of Arabs in Israeli society are four factors that any public policy must come to terms with. The first is political democracy in which civil liberties and equal opportunities are supposedly granted to all. The second is the Jewish-Zionist character of the state, which casts different group statuses, with Jews being afforded preferential treatment and Arabs being regarded as outsiders. The third force of national security turns Arabs into a hostile minority, suspected of possible collaboration with the enemy. The last consideration concerns the features of the Arabs themselves as a small (14 per cent, excluding East Jerusalem), permanent, nonassimilating, westernizing, internally divided and socio-economically disadvantaged minority that is considerably vulnerable and manipulable. These four forces that shape Arab status constitute constraints and challenges for policies towards the Arabs.

The declared policy stresses political democracy as the decisive force and the attainment of equality and integration as the major objective. It is abundantly manifest in official statements. In the Declaration of Independence, Arabs were promised equality of social and political rights and full participation in Israeli society. Integration was a basic principle of all labour governments up until the changeover in May 1977: ‘The policy of the Government of Israel will aim towards the complete integration of the minorities in Israel into all spheres of life in the State, while respecting their religious and cultural individuality’ (Israel, Prime Minister's Office, 1977: 8). Prime Minister Begin spoke in this vein when presenting the Likud government: 'Jews and Arabs, Druzes and Circassians can live together in this country. They should live together in peace, with mutual respect and equal rights, in freedom and socioeconomic progress' (Knesset Proceedings, 20 June 1977). In order to carry out the official policy of equality and integration, separate Arab departments operate in government offices, the Histadrut and major political parties. They officially aim to cater to the special needs of Arabs, to protect their rights, to
help develop their settlements and expedite their participation in Israeli society.

The actual policy diverges, however, from the consensual or consociational spirit of the declared policy. It consists of quite different presuppositions, goals and means.\(^1\)

**Presuppositions**

As a whole, the Jewish community in Palestine rejected the idea of a bi-national state and accepted the 1947 United Nations partition resolution that envisaged a Jewish state with an Arab minority. At the end of the 1948 war, Israel controlled a much bigger territory in which about 750,000 Arabs and 650,000 Jews lived in 1947. The mass exodus of Arabs and the mass immigration of Jews sharply reduced the Arab presence to a small minority. As a result, Israel was actually relieved of a large-scale minority problem and hence the top leadership and public at large did not develop an interest in the internal Arab question.

Moreover, the Arab question is considered temporary. While during the early years of the state the Arabs believed that Israel was ephemeral, many Jews expected Arabs to disappear so that they would not have to establish permanent relations with them (Lin, 1971: 313). Although both sides have become more realistic over the years, the idea that the Arab problem should be put in abeyance until the settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict is ingrained. It exempts the authorities from a policy-making that will lead in the long run to peaceful Arab-Jewish coexistence and legitimizes present decisions that might shatter the chances of living together in the future. Lin, who was the chairman of the Arab Department of Labour Party until 1968, wrote: The general assumption was that all that should be done for the time being in this area till our relations with the Arab countries are made clear, is to prevent fires or put them out’ (1971: 311). Toledano, the Prime Minister's Advisor on Arab Affairs between the years 1965 and 1976, said: 'as long as there is a state of war between Israel and the Arab states, there is no radical solution to the difficult issue of the Arab minority living in Israel. On the other hand, there is no doubt that it is possible to ease the situation and to hold it in check’ (1975).

The idea that the Arab problem is transitory yet intractable has from the very beginning shaped the priorities in handling Arabs. The general guideline for decisions is the precedence of the Jewish-Zionist mission of the state and national security over political democracy. The Arab vulnerability makes it possible to rank Arab interest at the bottom with relative impunity. Policy-makers see Arabs as a threat and as an obstacle to the national goals of security, immigration, economic growth, settlement and population dispersion. Arabs also have to be contained in order to ensure the flow of their services to the dominant group.

Once these priorities are set, the authority for dealing with Arabs is delegated from the public to the regime. The Jewish public neither considers Arabs as part of the state nor does it perceive their problem as a national
issue. Hence it grants the authorities a free hand in handling Arab affairs and renounces its right to intervene in policy-making. The gut feeling of the Jew in the street is that Arabs enjoy extra privileges, are exempted from duties and are afforded abundant educational and economic opportunities. It is also felt that Arabs, as a hostile minority, do not deserve such advantageous conditions, particularly when compared to the predicament of both Jews and Arabs in Arab countries.

The establishment itself has, nevertheless, neither the interest nor the time to deal with Arab matters. Since it has no positive expectations of them, such as Arabs becoming equal and active partners in Israeli society, it does not define this situation as a state concern that requires planning, allocation of resources and ongoing daily care. It is interested in localizing the problem in order to be free to attend to what are considered really important state affairs.

This attitude prompted an additional delegation of authority from the top decision-makers to the Arabists who head the Arab departments. These Jewish experts who have a knowledge of Arabic are supposed to grasp the special needs of the Arab population and to intercede between the authorities and the Arabs. In fact, the existence of separate Arab departments of secondary rank is designed to keep the Arab issue permanently out of the policy-making agenda. Since the Arab departments were created as part of the arrangement for the delegation of authority, the Arabists' success in their duties is measured by their ability to preserve the status quo, to check the problem and to relieve the establishment and the general public from the necessity of responding to Arab needs. In addition, the separate frameworks for Arabs and Jews make it possible to practise a policy in the Jewish sector that differs from that in the Arab sector. They facilitate the use of double standards in education, housing, agriculture, regional development and other spheres.

For these reasons, the Arabists are not keen to propose innovative policies or to take risks in suggesting far-reaching changes. In order to usher in radical transformations, the active backing of the establishment and the general public must be gained. This would, nonetheless, amount to an infringement of the delegation of authority and the undermining of the status quo. The Arabists therefore prefer the strengthening of conservative forces in the Arab sector, compromises and piecemeal reforms.

Goals

According to the above conception of the Arab status in Israel, the existing policy is that of domination rather than consensus-building or consociationalism. The main objective is to institutionalize effective domination over Arabs for an unlimited period of time for the purpose both of averting the threat to Israel's national security and Jewish-Zionist character and of harnessing Arab resources on behalf of the Jewish majority. These are the general principles of the policy in reality that enjoy a broad consensus.
The more specific operative goals are four, each of which has two facets - achievement and avoidance:

1. **Loyal citizens.** In order to attain this goal, Arabs are afforded civil rights, including franchise and freedom of expression, organization and movement. Apart from laws which apply directly to the religious and cultural uniqueness of Arabs in Israel, the state endeavours to avoid any legal distinction between Arabs and Jews. For instance, even in the military service law there is no mention of national origin. In return for civil rights, Arabs are expected to maintain law and order. Israel wishes to prevent the Arabs from becoming a security and political threat. Hostile Arab activity might entail espionage, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, the terrorizing of loyal Arabs, and political struggle internally or abroad, which is detrimental to Israel's international status (Non, 1969: 332). In order to forestall such developments, Arabs are placed under surveillance until 1966 openly by the military government and since then by more subtle and covert means. Arabs (excluding Druzes) are also exempted from military service. Similarly, they are barred from sensitive places of employment so as to deny them access to confidential information. Their residence in separate settlements and quarters facilitates the ongoing security measures and effective control in the event of resistance with force. From the fulfillment of this specific goal, it is obvious that national security takes precedence over the egalitarian-democratic ethos.

2. **Minority members.** A suitable assessment of this specific goal requires a familiarity with some of the difficulties of its completion. It is not easy for Arabs to accept the reversal in their status from a numerical majority to a minority as a result of the creation of Israel. Yet although the Arabs became a minority in the state, they have remained a majority in the Middle East. It is also especially hard for Muslims, who constitute a majority among Arabs in Israel, to adapt to minority status. In addition, internal and external developments conducive to changing Arabs from a vulnerable ethnic minority to a powerful national minority are under way. These are serious obstacles in reconciling Arabs to a minority status in a Jewish-Zionist state. At the same time, the authorities want to prevent Arabs from becoming a strong force that might endanger Israel as a state with Jewish institutions, Jewish majority, preferred status given to Jewish citizens and the Zionist mission.

The threats against this supreme cause are many. The most salient are assimilation, biculturalism, institutional autonomy, state-wide leadership and regional majority.

a) Prevention of assimilation. The regime is heedful of reinforcing the Arab characteristics of Arabs in Israel as a powerful brake against assimilation. Arabs are accorded a right to separate identity. They are allowed to maintain separate institutions (such as schools, communications media and religious bodies) in order to preserve a separate existence. The religious marriage laws inhibit mixed marriages from evolving into acceptable social norms.

b) Unilateral biculturalism. Biculturalism means that individuals or institutions are bilingual and they adopt practices taken from both cultures. It has different meanings for Arabs and Jews. Although, as mentioned above, the
establishment discourages Arabs’ assimilation, it does undertake to infuse them with institutional and individual biculturalism. This is because biculturalism can ease their adaptation to life in Israel and diminish their alienation as an Arab minority in a Jewish-Zionist state.

On the other hand, biculturalism is viewed as inappropriate for the Jews. Institutional biculturalism might blur the Jewish nature of the state institutions, and individual biculturalism might weaken the hold against assimilation, a phenomenon which characterizes Jewish populations in industrialized countries the world over. Hence the establishment is diligent in scattering distinct ‘Zionist culture’ among Jews originating from different cultural backgrounds and in keeping them away from Arab-Jewish biculturalism.

c) Denial of institutional autonomy. Institutional autonomy means that Arabs control their separate institutions. While the regime allows institutional separation between Arabs and Jews, it does not grant Arabs institutional autonomy. Arab local authorities, like the Jewish ones, are under strict control of the Ministry of the Interior and their level of development is determined to a great extent by external forces. Arab education is controlled by Jews. The Arabic communications media, except the ones dominated by Rakah, are in Jewish hands. The heads and directors of the separate Arab departments are Jews. Jews exert great influence over the activities and staff of religious institutions and the Muslim Waqf (property endowment). The authorities are largely responsible for the lack of independent national Arab bodies like trade unions or a university. The establishment regards the existence of Arab-ruled institutions as exceedingly hazardous as they might impose a binational character on the state, constitute a power base for resistance to the regime and incubate an irredentist movement.

d) Containment of state-wide leadership. The authorities not only deny Arabs institutional autonomy, they also contain the emergence of state-wide national leadership. This is because leadership of such a type can win the support of the Arab masses and demand recognition as the legitimate representative of the ‘Israeli-Palestinian national minority’. Operating in this spirit, university administrations refuse to officially recognize Arab student committees, although elected in democratic elections, and needless to say there is no official body which is ready to go along with the National Committee of Arab Students. This is also the main reason why the establishment declines to acknowledge the National Committee of Heads of Arab Local Authorities and the Committee for Defence of Arab Lands as authoritative representatives of Arabs in Israel. Rakah is not banned because, inter alia, it is a Jewish-Arab Communist party which does not vie for the throne of representative national Arab leadership. As long as the Sons of the Village Movement limits its activities mainly to the local level, it will not be declared illegal.

The government does not hesitate to issue administrative bans to stifle serious efforts to form a state-wide national leadership, best known of which are the outlawing of the AI-Ard Movement in the early 1960s and the banning by a military injunction on 1 December 1980 of the conference of Arab leaders (‘the Arab Congress’), and on 12 April 1981 of the umbrella organization of nine radical action groups (‘The National Coordinating Committee’).
This policy towards the Arab leadership is well stated in the document 'Arabs in Israel - Policy', submitted to the political committee of the Maarakh (the labour alignment) in 1973: 'The formation of a state-wide Arab leadership must be prevented. Leadership on a local, sectarian, regional, or trade-union level should be encouraged. . . . Power should be split among Arab leaders in order to avert the concentration of political power by one or several leaders' (Israel Labour Party, 1973). Similarly revealing is the Minister of Justice's explanation that the outlawed Arab congress was considered subversive because its organizers 'hoped to establish a separate Arab entity in Israel and to set up a permanent forum that would eventually become the representative Arab body and serve as an address for the PLO when it attempted to harness the Israeli Arabs to its cause' (Jerusalem Post International Edition, 7-13 December 1980).

More positively, the deliberate policy has been to retain the traditional local hamula elders and to recruit a new corps of modern leaders - both affiliated and accountable to the Zionist establishment (for details on the cooption techniques used, see Lustick, 1980: ch. 6).

e) The undermining of a regional majority status. For similar reasons the regime views with disfavour regions in which Arabs are or are becoming a demographic majority. It is maintained that the existence of a territorial power base constitutes above all a security hazard. However, many Jews consider the prevalence of Arab geo-cultural regions a flaw in the Jewish-Zionist character of the state. Consequently, the government launches programs to Judaize western and central Galilee, the northern Negev and to a lesser extent the little Triangle. It is intended to ensure Jewish superiority in all regions.

3. Suppliers of services. Although the Zionist settlement of Palestine and national policies in Israel have pursued Jewish self-sufficiency, Arab involvement has always played some role. The Arab minority cannot simply be ignored, because it has the potential of rewarding Jews by furnishing services and of penalizing them by holding back or even by successfully competing with Jews for the available resources.

It is, therefore, a goal of the policy to assure that the present state of vulnerability will endure so that Arabs will not thwart the use of their services by the Jewish majority and will not organize themselves to strive for equal status in the state. Only if Arabs remain disorganized can they uninterruptedly provide the needed services and enable Israel to invest much less than the average in subsidies and development in the Arab sector.

Arabs supply three major services:

a) Labourers. Arabs constitute 9 per cent of all employed Israelis. They make up, however, one-quarter or more of the labourers or low-status workers, especially in construction. There is a shortage of production workers that is increasingly filled by Arabs. The growing Arab economic integration provides non-European Jews with short-range social mobility, particularly to lower white-collar occupations in the Jewish economy that are closed to Arabs. Emigration, strikes, frequent absenteeism, or upward mobility by Arab workers can hurt the Israeli economy.
b) *Landowners.* Although over 90 per cent of the land in Israel is publicly owned, Arabs are the single largest private landowners. The national goals of land settlement and population dispersion necessitate the massive deterritorialization of Arabs (Rosenfeld, 1978: 400). Over 1.25 million dunams (one dunam is one-quarter of an acre) of Arab lands were expropriated since 1948, amounting to over half of all Arab lands and hurting close to two-thirds of all landowning Arab families. About two million dunams in the Negev and some lands in other areas are still disputed. These land losses have expedited Arab proletarization, have reduced Arab regional majority status and have boosted Jewish land settlement and population dispersion.

c) *Voters.* Arabs constitute one-tenth of the Israeli electorate and they definitely count in the highly competitive, multi-party Israeli system. Over the years about two-thirds of them have voted for the Zionist parties (by and large for the ruling labour and religious parties) and in the 1977 national elections 49 per cent so cast their votes. Arabs vote even in higher proportions for the Zionist dominant parties in the Histadrut trade-union elections.

4. *Israeli-Arabs.* The idea is to turn Arabs into a collection of new ethnic minorities with an Israeli Arab rather than a Palestinian identity. This objective has three complementary components:

a) *A mixture of minorities.* The intention is to divide the non-Jews into a large number of distinct minorities. The Druzes are granted religious status and are handled increasingly apart from other Arabs. The non-Arab traits of Circassians, Ahmedians, Armenians and others are stressed. Bedouin are differentially treated in the hope of the emergence of a separate political community. A similar attempt is made to strengthen the separate status of the Christians, and a recommendation to this effect appears in another confidential document of the Israel Labour Party: The Christian communities vis-à-vis the Moslem majority should be given special treatment and their distinctive character should be accentuated in order to prevent state-wide Arab organizations whose activities are determined by a nationalist Muslim spirit’ (Israel Labour Party, 1974: 3).

b) *De-Palestinization.* An additional aim is to cut off, as far as possible, the cultural, nationality and identity ties of Arabs in Israel from the Palestinian population and, by so doing, to curb the development of Palestinian national consciousness among them. Although this aim has been in existence since the declaration of the state, it came to the fore only later, after the 1967 war, following the resumption of contact with the Palestinian people and the intensification of Palestinian nationalism.

c) *A new Israeli identity.* The new identity which the regime wishes to inculcate in Arabs in Israel is ethnic, religious or cultural but not national. It is feared that national (Arab, all the more so Palestinian) identity might make Arabs in Israel a unified national minority. An organized minority can demand institutional autonomy and collective rights and threaten the uninational Jewish-Zionist nature of the state. Prime Minister Rabin was unequivocally explicit on this point when he dismissed a memorandum by the National Committee of Heads of Arab Local Authorities advancing the idea of Israel
as a binational state, declared that Arabs are a religious and cultural but not a national minority, and consequently refused to recognize this Committee as the authoritative representation of Arabs in Israel (Maariv, 20 June 1976).

The clearest indication of the intent to transform Arabs to a new Israeli ethnic minority is Arab education, which aims to distribute biculturalism yet is devoid of national Arab or Palestinian objectives. Another sign is the encouragement of 'Israeli Arab consciousness' and 'Druze consciousness'.

The specific goals and their components fall in order of priority. At the top ranks the goal of making Arabs loyal citizens because it directly relates to national security and law and order. Arab resignation to their minority status in a Jewish-Zionist state ranks next, followed by the goal of keeping the supply of Arab services. At the lower end is the goal of creating new ethnic minorities cut off from the Palestinian nation. Within the goals themselves, the negative sub-goals are more important than the positive ones. For instance, the refraining by Arabs from hostilities against the state is more highly regarded than their identification with Israel. By the same token, their noninvolvement in the Israeli-Arab conflict is more appreciated than their 'contribution' to the state in manpower and land.

The above four operative goals of policy towards the Arabs are far removed from the official goals of integration and equality. This is because equality and integration serve in practice as means rather than ultimate ends. The Jewish majority has neither an ideological commitment nor a willingness to invest the immense resources to shatter the institutionalized ethnic stratification (i.e. to close the gaps in education, occupation, material well-being and positions of power between Arabs and Jews). As much as measures are taken to promote equality (such as five-year development plans of Arab villages and dispensation of benefits during elections), they are directed towards achieving other goals, viz. to strengthen Arabs' loyalty to the state, to prompt them to resign themselves to their fate as a vulnerable minority and to keep them away from the Palestinian people. Allocation of resources to Arabs is not yet accepted as a basic right due to them as citizens. It is perceived rather as a favour or reward for the demonstration of loyalty, compliance and cooperation.

The same holds true for integration. Integration is not an aim in itself as it may lead to assimilation. It is instrumental in pacifying Arabs. Economic integration renders Arabs dependent on Jewish employers, suppliers and buyers. Political integration implies Arab reconciliation with the Zionist mission of the Jewish political parties. Other institutional integration staves off the rise of independent national Arab organizations.

Means

It should be clear from the discussion of the operative goals that the present policy of domination, like any other policy of domination, rests on the two central mechanisms of economic dependence and political control. Since a detailed analysis of these mechanisms is made elsewhere (Lustick, 1980;
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Smooha, 1980a), it will suffice here to indicate several major points.

1. Economic dependence. Economic dependence on Jews denies Arabs an independent economic base for a political struggle. Arabs rely on Jews as employers, providers of services and as decision-makers on the allocation of public funds. There is no separate Arab economy. The value of Arab agricultural production is marginal (only 7 per cent) in Israeli agriculture. While Arabs constitute one-tenth of the Israeli civilian labour force, the economic power (ownership, management, trade-union leadership) is concentrated in Jewish hands. Arabs lack a bourgeoisie which owns large industrial and commercial concerns and have no trade-unions of their own. They are devoid of external financial resources like the United Jewish Appeal. Being without a developed physical and social infrastructure, Arab settlements are unable to provide employment for members of the Arab intelligentsia who have leadership skills. Indeed, about half of the Arab college graduates work as teachers, who are civil servants, and most of the others depend in one way or another on Jews. The comprehensive material dependence of Arabs on Jews facilitates political control over them: since employed Arabs depend for their livelihood on Jews and Arab settlements rely on governmental subsidies, it is possible to offer concessions and to purchase peace inexpensively.

2. Political control. The constant political control over Israeli Arabs is intended to directly prevent a national struggle. The 1945 Defence (Emergency) Regulations (including the 1979 amendments), which are put into effect according to need, are the legal bases for control and for its smooth operation even without imposing a military government. The dense spread of the security services in the Arab sector guarantees ongoing, deterrent, detecting and punitive surveillance. The efficiency of the security services is aided by the economic dependence (which generates a large reservoir of candidates for collaboration) and the hamula structure (which makes it possible to gain information and to exercise control through several local key persons only). There is a noticeable element of control in breaking territorial concentrations by land confiscations in Arab regions and setting up a network of Jewish settlements there. Similarly, control over existing Arab institutions in the educational and religious spheres aims to prevent them from becoming independent bases of power. For this reason, an effort is made to obstruct the formation of independent national Arab institutions, such as a party, a trade-union, a communications medium and a university. At the same time, the authorities encourage internal rifts, both sectarian and hamula, and try to foster the consciousness of ethnic (non-Palestinian) identity in each group. Additionally, support is given to ‘positive’ leaders, whether they are hamula heads or the educated or young who are willing to cooperate, but ‘negative’ leaders are discouraged. The reasonable and calculated use of power by the authorities and their avoidance of random terror contribute appreciably to the efficiency of political control.
Variations

The domination policy towards Arabs is no doubt part of the operative national consensus, and as such it is accepted by the general Jewish public and the major Zionist parties (Maarakh, Likud and the National Religious Party). However, a controversy has raged for many years among makers and administrators of this policy concerning its more specific direction. Today it is possible to distinguish between liberal and hardline policy. Despite the tendency to overstate the differences between these two lines, they are in fact only variations on the agreed-upon domination policy. In other words, both sides accede to the goal of domination of Arabs in order to deter them from being a threat to national security and the Jewish-Zionist mission and to arrest their resources for the Jewish good. They also consent to the strategies of economic dependence and political control for achieving this goal. They disagree, however, on the emphasis, procedures, tactics and assessments of the situation.

1. The liberal policy. Toledano (1969, 1974, 1975, 1977) is considered the ideologist and implementer of the liberal policy, which was dominant in the years 1966-78. According to this line, domination should be based more on economic dependence than on political control. The Arab passive compliance is attainable by a conditional flow of resources for development, provision of employment for all in the Jewish economy, opening the civil service and other white-collar jobs to the Arab intelligentsia to facilitate its cooptation, and wide distribution of personal benefits. In this manner, the vested interests of as many Arabs as possible in the existing system are promoted.

As long as the Israeli-Arab conflict continues, Arabs in Israel will face the irresolvable dilemma of loyalty to the state as against loyalty to the Arab world (‘My people fight my country,’ as Zubi used to say). The policy should, therefore, be founded on realistic compromises. For the time being, a certain inequality in duties and rights between Arabs and Jews is unavoidable. Arabs should not be required to serve in the army or in its place to fulfil civil service duties. They should also not be required to demonstrate loyalty actively. Today, it is impossible to change the basic hostile attitude of Arabs towards the state, and they should not be prohibited from expressing verbal protest as long as their behaviour remains non-hostile.

The regime should refrain from detrimental and inessential measures (such as the land expropriation of 1976) and should make benevolent gestures (such as allowing the return of the displaced residents of Ikrit and Biram). It must also avoid as far as possible the exercise of power, keep ongoing security surveillance low-key, and educate the Jewish public to be more open to Arabs. The prime interest of Israel is to delay the anticipated confrontation between Arabs and Jews for as long as possible. It is worthwhile paying a rising economic price for internal peace. There is no substitute for reliance on economic means to dominate Arabs, as long as Israel wishes to preserve its democratic regime and the backing of the Western world, which is sensitive to civil and minority rights.
2. The hardline policy. Lin (1971) is regarded as the ideologist of the hardline policy. This line requires a shift of emphasis from economic dependence to political control. Under conditions of an improving material situation and increasing alienation from the state, economic means become less and less effective and hence the policy towards Arabs should rely mainly on political control.

For political control to be both just and efficient, the duties and rights of Arabs and Jews should in the first place be equalized. It is maintained that Arabs ought to do military service or alternatively civil service, to shoulder the burden of taxes equally, to construct buildings with permits only, not to squat on state land, to refrain from public identification with the enemy, etc. In this manner, a clearcut distinction will be made between 'positive' and 'negative' Arabs. This distinction is supposed to be the cornerstone in the policy even though most Arabs would opt to be 'negative' (including the young, the educated, Rakah members and sympathizers, and nationalist circles). The 'positive' Arabs would find the Jewish society open and enjoy definite advantages. At the same time, economic and political sanctions will be exercised against 'negative' Arabs, including dismissal from the civil service, expulsion from universities, confinement to their immediate localities, and being closely watched, harassed and brought to justice.

The hardline policy can block the Arab radicalization and strengthen the 'positive' camp. If it is applied consistently, it could delay the inevitable showdown between the 'negative' majority of Arabs and the Jews, in which Arabs would be hurt while damaging the state. Israel should act strongly to halt the radicalization in the Arab sector. It can do so mainly by using power against the 'negative' Arabs since they interpret the tolerance and patience of the regime as a weakness. A significant rise in the price Arabs have to pay for hostility would guarantee internal quiet.

The characterization of these two variations of the domination policy may help to distinguish between the policy of the labour alignment (Maarakh) and that of the right-wing Likud towards the Arabs in Israel. As expected, the Maarakh is closer to the liberal line, whereas the Likud is nearer to the hard-line position. Despite the initial continuity of policy, it became evident by 1980 that the Likud government, as compared to the previous labour governments, (a) relies more on coercive legislation, restrictive orders, preventive measures and other political controls, (b) tends to be tactless and even antagonistic in pronouncements, (c) lacks an organizational base in the Arab sector and hence finds it more difficult to strike deals with the Arab population, and consequently (d) is perceived by Arabs as more rigid, alienated and hostile.

Results

The question arises to what extent the policy towards Arabs has succeeded. An unambiguous answer is not easy to come by, because it depends largely on the specific criterion of success and the level of expectation from the policy. On the one hand, the policy can be presented as a failure. This is the attitude
of the Jewish public during periods of strain in its relations with the Arab population. Severe criticism was levelled, for example, following the detection of sabotage rings in which Arab citizens participated, the ascent of Rakah to power in Nazareth and its gaining of half of the Arab vote in the 1977 national elections and the 1976 Land Day events. There is no doubt that the Arab public itself, to whom the policy is applied, is also not satisfied. In the 1980 representative national sample of Arabs, 55 per cent of the respondents held that the government policy widens the socio-economic gap between Arabs and Jews, 32 per cent said that it has no effect and only 13 per cent estimated that it narrows the gap. Even from the establishment's viewpoint, the current policy is deficient. It does not accomplish its two official aims of equality and integration between Arabs and Jews. Furthermore, according to leading Arabists' forecasts, Arab-Jewish confrontation should be expected and the present policy can at best postpone but not preclude it.

On the other hand, it is possible to portray the existing policy as successful given its minimal operative goals and the constraints under which it operates. Its chief objective of neutralizing the Arab minority was obtained. Arabs have remained a passive and marginal element in Israeli society. They did not obstruct the implementation of the prime state aims in the areas of security, foreign affairs, internal order, economy, immigration and settlement. They neither engaged in civil resistance nor became a fifth column. They reconciled themselves with the policy which directly affected them adversely. One striking example is resignation to the military government, in the abolition of which they played little part. Another instance is their restrained response (prior to the Land Day of 1976) to the massive land take-overs.

These impressive achievements of the present policy were attained at relatively low cost. The extent of violence was negligible. With some exceptions (the Kfar Kassem Affair and the Land Day incidents), there were almost no casualties. Even the resources allocated for this purpose were quite meagre. At the same time, the limited investments in Arabs in Israel realized handsome profits in terms of added manpower essential to the economy, confiscated lands for which compensation was below the market value, and votes gained to strengthen the Zionist parties.

A realistic appraisal of the policy towards the Arabs should be founded upon a dynamic perspective. During the first half of the thirty-two years of statehood, the policy was effective. However, during the second half it has slowly been eroded following the formation of Rakah in 1965, the lifting of the military government in 1966, the Six-Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Additional factors which add to Arab power include the rise of a new generation, the population explosion, the revolution of rising expectations, class differentiation, the formation of an elite and a leadership, the crystallization of sophisticated political culture, the emergence of the PLO and the Palestinization of identity. The erosion of the domination policy is, nonetheless, not an offshoot of this or other change in the Arab status. Domination of minorities is inconsistent with political democracy, an economy with full employment and rapid growth as in Israel, and therefore is bound to
wear away. Under these circumstances the minority becomes stronger over time, and if direct repression is not enforced to halt the erosion, the machinery of domination is weakened'.

Reforms

In response to the deterioration of the domination policy, a number of plans to handle Arabs were submitted. The public proposals are usually supposed to ameliorate the present situation through continuing liberalization of the current policy. At the same time, several reforms purporting to reinforce domination became known.

1. Liberal reforms. There is little new in the series of liberal reforms to the existing policy suggested by various establishmentarian bodies. Equality and integration as the guiding principles of the official policy recurred in public commission reports during the 1970s. In addition, spheres in need of improvement were reviewed and recommendations were made. It will suffice to mention only a few of these plans. The Geraisy Committee (1973) detailed the backward Arab municipal services and called for equality in treatment and standards between Arab and Jewish local authorities. The Koversky Committee (1976) proposed legalizing the unlicensed buildings located within the boundaries of Arab local authorities and accelerating the preparation of master plans for Arab localities. Another study team documented the housing predicament in the Arab sector and put forward a plan of housing assistance (Kipnis, 1978).

In the area of education, the Peled Committee (1975) specified the means of bridging the educational gap between Arabs and Jews and set forth a modification in the goals of Arab education. Another commissioned study designed a decentralization scheme of the department of Arab education (Haaretz, 24 April 1978).

The Harel Committee (1976) surveyed the Histadrut activities in the Arab sector and made recommendations in four fields. With regard to organization, it urged completing the integration of Arabs on workers' councils, on labour committees and in departments in the Histadrut headquarters. As to participation in decision-making, the increase of Arab representation in the governing bodies was advocated. In the social-cultural area, more activities were advised. Economically, Hevrat Haovdim (the Histadrut service and industrial complex) was counselled to build plants in Arab settlements.

Three all-embracing programs were formulated in political parties but they are nationally oriented. One was advanced by Cohen (1976), the director of the Arab department of the Israel Labour Party, the second by Kol (1979), the former head of the Independent Liberal Party, and the third by Shai (1978), the Movement for Change and Initiative. The recommendations called, inter alia, for promoting equality in the living conditions of Arabs and Jews, greater participation of Arabs in state institutions, Arab incorporation into Zionist parties, a year of national service in lieu of military conscription, and the creation of permanent high-ranking state committees for Arab affairs.
A similar approach was propounded by a team of experts, mostly Orientalists, who deliberated Israel's transition from war to peace (Neaman Institute, 1979).

The public pressures accompanying the Land Day strike eventually prompted the government to reconsider its policy in its meeting of 23 May 1976. Proposals were made to the government by the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Arab Affairs in which many of the above recommendations were included. The government neither announced any new policy nor put out its resolutions in a public document. The approved actions which were executed immediately were the formation of both a ministerial committee for Arab affairs and the Jewish-Arab Public Council. It was also resolved to enhance equality between Arabs and Jews in basic services, education and political representation as well as social integration (Jewish-Arab Public Council, 1976: 3-4).

The above reforms, although compatible with the existing domination policy, were only partially carried out because the Arab minority is not strong enough to thrust them upon the Jewish majority.

2. Hardline reforms. As compared to well-publicized liberal reforms, the hardline ones tend to be confidential because of the democratic ethos, but some of them have been leaked to the press or surfaced during implementation. The 'Koenig Report' (1976) is, no doubt, the most detailed and definite proposal for consolidating the domination policy. This secret memorandum, which was submitted to the government by the Northern District Commissioner, called for the thinning out of Arab population concentrations, the harassment of radicals, the use of smear tactics against Rakah leaders, restrictions on the number of university graduates, tough law enforcement, expanded surveillance, the reduction of Jewish economic dependence on Arabs, and so on.

Other strong-arm reforms were legislated. In the summer of 1980, the Knesset passed an amendment to the 'Terror Act - 1948' which makes it a criminal offence to express public identification with a terrorist organization. It is directed against Arabs who declare their support of the PLO. In addition, an amendment to the citizenship law was enacted that may have a special implication for dissident Arabs. It authorizes the Minister of the Interior to revoke, without trial or right of appeal, the Israeli citizenship of a person who 'committed an action implying a breach of allegiance to the State of Israel'. Another law provided for the speedy expropriation of Bedouin lands, earmarked for a military airfield in the Negev, without allowing for a court appeal.

Among further stiff measures was frequent resorting to the military regulations for restricting the movement of radical Arab students, Rakah functionaries and other activists. In addition, the 'Green Patrol' was established to throw out and even sell Bedouin flocks, suspected of trespassing, without due process. About thirty 'Observation Posts' were also set up all over Galilee to monitor Arabs squatting on state land and to remove them. In April 1979, the Knesset Finance Committee issued a report attributing large-scale tax evasions to Arabs in general and Arab self-employed in particular and urged the government to take strong action in this matter (Israel, Knesset, 1979).
The implementation of the hardline reforms by the Likud government were accompanied by harsh declarations. To quote only two cabinet ministers, Minister of Agriculture Sharon said that national land is actually robbed by foreigners. Although there is talk of the Judaization of Galilee, the region is regressing into a Gentile district. I initiated strong action to prevent aliens from taking state lands' (Maariv, 9 September 1977). Arab citizens were referred to as aliens. Later, on the occasion of the ban on the Arab congress, Sharon also made an implicit threat of deportation: 'While we have no intention of displacing Arab citizens from Galilee, I would advise the Arab citizens in the area not to radicalize their positions in order not to bring about another tragedy like the one that befell the Palestinian people in 1948. Even if we do not want it, it may recur.' Another Minister scornfully remarked that Israel keeps an open door for any Arab citizen 'who does not like to live here. He can The a taxi cab . . . to cross the [Jordan's] bridge.

. . . We will even wave him goodbye' (Haaretz, 4 December 1980, quoted in the editorial).

The alternative policy

Over against the reforms, some radical and comprehensive solutions for the Arab problem are proposed. They utterly disregard one or more of the above fundamental forces shaping Arab status and hence they are inescapably utopian. Included among these utopias are the Canaanite state (Ratosh, 1976), a secular-democratic state (Tessler, 1975), and population transfer (Kahane, 1977), in all of which the Arab question ceases to exist.

By presenting an alternative policy, it is not intended to suggest yet another reform or utopia. The intention is rather to outline an alternative policy which can guarantee a modes vivendi significantly different from the status quo. Broadly speaking, the alternative policy differs from the existing one in the shift of emphasis in Arab-Jewish relations from the present domination to coexistence marked by greater consent and partnership. The superordinate aim is to move away from a model of political integration based on domination over the Arab minority to a greater use of the voluntary mechanisms in the models of consensus-building and consociationalism.

Underlying assumptions

The existing and alternative policies differ in a number of paramount ways. First, in order to keep the Arab problem manageable, Israel must give up the occupied territories, otherwise Arabs will reach unmanageable numerical proportions. A possible Arab majority will set up a vicious circle of Arab offensive and Jewish repression. While the present policy distinguishes between Arabs on the two sides of the Green line, the retention of the territories will continue to antagonize the Arabs in Israel.

Second, the point of departure of the alternative policy is that Arabs are a stable minority and therefore a permanent, noncoercive settlement
should be reached with them. The thirty-two years of statehood, which have seen many changes, have proved that Arabs are not a transient element. The frequent wars did not cause their flight, and their living standards in times of relative quiet did not push them to emigrate. Seventy-three per cent of the Arabs interviewed in 1980 expressed unwillingness to even consider a move to a Palestinian state were it to be established alongside Israel. The alternative policy assumes that the problem will not be resolved by the settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict. National security is a constraint which makes the tackling of the question difficult, but it is not an insurmountable obstacle. Hence the exploration of a solution should not be delayed until overall peace in the Middle East is attained.

Third, the conception of the alternative policy requires a reconsideration of the imposed constraints. The idea is to raise the egalitarian-democratic ethos to head the value-scale concerning Arabs in Israel. In cases where there is no concrete and immediate danger to national security and the Jewish-Zionist character of the state, the alternative policy insists upon applying the rules of democracy and equality to Arabs. In other words, it regards security and the Jewish-Zionist state as constraints to be taken into account rather than superior goals which subordinate other considerations and warrant the fullest implementation. In contrast to the commonly held opinion that security is the gravest impediment in the way of Arab-Jewish relations, the alternative policy emphasizes the Jewish-Zionist mission of Israel as being an equally if not more serious barrier. Arabs suffer no less from the preference of Jews \textit{qua} Jews and from the Judaization of policies and public institutions than from an unduly excessive sensitivity to security on the part of Jews. Hence any moderation of the Jewish-Zionist nature of the state would improve understanding between Jews and Arabs.

Forth, the alternative policy stresses the achievement of positive goals. As against the present policy, which takes the neutralization of Arabs in the state as a prime objective, it aims to strive for peaceful coexistence between Arabs and Jews. It recognizes the pluralistic structure of Israeli society as well as the Arabs' right, like any other community, to organize themselves as a pressure group. It regards equality as an operative target rather than a means to buy internal tranquillity.

Fifth and last, the alternative policy defines the situation of the Arab minority as a state concern and aspires to eliminate the practice of 'delegation of authority'. It aims to salvage the problem from the exclusive care of the Arabists and to reinstate it in the hands of policy-makers and the general public. The return of responsibility to the establishment is designed to contribute to a more fully comprehensive policy and to its firmer application. The Jewish public's sharing the responsibility for policy is intended to moderate its extreme stands on the Arab question. This is because extremism is partly due to lack of public involvement in this matter and to the transfer of authority to the regime. Besides, instead of unilateral policy-making and its imposition on the Arab minority, as is done today, the alternative policy advocates the recognition of the Arab public as a legitimate party and as a
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The alternatives

In principle, it is possible to discern various alternatives to the existing policy on the 'approachment-avoidance' spectrum between Arabs and Jews. Among these, three distinct ones are chosen for presentation below in order to throw into relief the gamut of possibilities.

1. **Maximal incorporation.** The alternative of maximal incorporation aims to integrate as much as possible but without assimilating the Arabs as individuals into Israeli society. The Arabs will develop an Israeli Palestinian identity. They will regard themselves as an integral part of Israel, and the Jews, for their part, will see them as equals and partners. Although Israel will remain a Jewish-Zionist state, bilingualism and biculturalism will be fostered and common cultural patterns will evolve. Civil rights and duties, apart from the Law of Return, will be uniform and implemented irrespective of origin. To put it differently, military service will be imposed on Arabs in the same way as it is on Jews, the separate Arab departments will be phased out, free Arab entry to any economic or political sphere would be guaranteed, and even legal permission for mixed marriages for those interested will be granted. In addition, the formation of common social frameworks, such as bilingual schools and mixed neighbourhoods, will be encouraged. Similarly, great efforts to narrow the gaps in modernization and resources between Arabs and Jews will be made. A special law against discrimination will be enacted and determined steps for its enforcement will be taken. State institutions and other public bodies, such as the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund, will avoid double standards or the use of national descent as a criterion in policy.

2. **Status as a Palestinian national minority.** This option confers on Arabs the status of a Palestinian national minority. They will identify themselves as Palestinian Arabs and as part of the Palestinian nation living in Israel and will be recognized as a national minority by the state. They will control and manage their existing institutions of education, religion and culture and will head the Arab departments. They will also form new, national and independent organizations such as a political party, a trade union, communications media and a university. They will be given great investments for setting up Arab-owned and -managed industries, for bringing the standard of services in Arab settlements up to par with those of Jews, and for lessening the Arab-Jewish socio-economic discrepancies. As well as being a part of the Jewish-Zionist state, the Palestinian Arab minority will nurture the cultural and other ties with the Arab world.

3. **A personal choice between integration and separation.** This possibility offers Arabs a personal choice between the above two options. By selective
implementation of elements from the two alternatives, the situation will arise where Arabs will be free to choose between considerable personal integration in Israeli society and equally considerable personal separation as members of a recognized Palestinian national minority. Arabs will be granted the same privilege as is enjoyed by religious Jews in Israel today, i.e. individual incorporation into the society at large or membership in communities having appreciable autonomy.

An appraisal

The three alternatives are similar in certain respects. They are assumed to be serious attempts to gain more harmonious coexistence between Arabs and Jews instead of the present situation of domination. All purport to preserve the Jewish-Zionist mould of the state. In each alternative, Arabs are endowed with better opportunities and rights than at present but not with totally equal status.

The three alternatives, however, differ significantly, particularly the first two. To sharpen the contrasts, the maximal incorporation option regards Arabs primarily as a cultural minority, whereas the other confers upon them full status as a Palestinian national minority. The first offers Arabs more equality but less expression for their Palestinian nationalism. It aims to individualize and neutralize Arabs as a national entity while the other option strives to pacify them with separate yet less equal status as a national minority. The two are dissimilar in the threat they present to the Jewish-Zionist nature of Israel. The first might blur the Jewish-Zionist mission of the state by rendering citizenship a central force and by creating an all-inclusive Israeli identity. The second, on the other hand, endangers the Jewish-Zionist character of the state by encouraging binationalism, transferring too much power to the Arabs and heightening the risk of an Arab irredentist movement.

As to the preferences of the Jewish majority, the three alternatives are not desirable because they diverge substantially from existing domination and thereby strengthen the Arab minority. Should the Jewish public be obliged to choose one of the three, it would opt for 'maximal incorporation' as the lesser evil. This is not because of a belief in integration but rather as a preventive measure against dangerous polarization commensurate with Palestinian nationalism. Were a Palestinian state established alongside Israel or were autonomy arranged in the administered territories, maximal incorporation of Arabs in Israel would furnish better safeguards against a resistance or irredentist movement than the conferring of Palestinian national minority status. On the other hand, it is possible that a new Palestinian entity would satisfy the national aspirations of Arabs in Israel so that they would resign themselves to living as a minority in a Jewish-Zionist state. In first any move toward a settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict will make Arabs and Jews in Israel more acceptable to each other because such a settlement will enhance the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of Arabs and will make Jews less defensively Zionistic and exclusionary. The peace treaty between Israel and Egypt has already had
such an impact on the Arabs in Israel. The proportion of Arabs recognizing Israel's right to exist rose from 50 per cent in 1976 to 59 per cent in 1980, whereas those denying this right dropped from 21 per cent to 11 per cent (Arabs with reservations remained 29-30 per cent). Reconciliation is conditional, of course, on providing Arabs with fuller rights, greater access to state institutions and a more proportional share of national resources.

Arabs' enthusiasm for these alternatives should not be expected as long as they oppose Israel's Jewish-Zionist character. They would, nevertheless, prefer them to their present situation as a dominated minority. Of the three possibilities the open alternative of a personal choice between individual integration into predominantly Jewish institutions and life in an autonomous Palestinian community would gratify the largest number of Arabs, but most would reconcile themselves to maximal incorporation if such an option were instituted by the Jews. This is because this alternative is compatible with the orientation of two out of the three camps in the Arab population. Maximal incorporation is accepted by the accommodating Arab (one-quarter of the population) who are already resigned to living in a Jewish-Zionist state if afforded greater opportunities. It will be also agreed to by the Arabs, constituting a majority of two-thirds, who belong to the 'reserved' camp. They acquiesce to the Rakah compromise of Arab-Jewish coexistence if equality is increased, if a Palestinian state rises alongside Israel so that Arabs can identify themselves with it and if the Jewish-Zionist features of the state are less prominent. Only the dissident camp (one-tenth) who reject in principle a minority status and aspire to a secular-democratic state instead of Israel will continue to resist this solution.

Findings of the 1980 national surveys of Arabs and Jews lend support to the above assessments. When asked what compromise settlement to the problem of Arabs in Israel they were willing to accept, 64 per cent of the Arabs opted for living as a people with equal rights in Israel, 4 per cent would move to a Palestinian state alongside Israel, 16 per cent wished such a state also to include Galilee and the little Triangle where most Arabs live, and 16 per cent insisted that a secular-democratic state should rise in all of Palestine. The majority of Arabs willing to remain part of Israel is larger among the more accommodating Arabs, and, more importantly, all the Arab leaders affiliated with the Zionist establishment as well as the independent Front or Rakah leaders are committed to staying in Israel. Only the small dissident section of the population and the activists in the Sons of the Village Movement and the Progressive National Movement reject being part of contemporary Israel.

In response to a question about the policy that Israel ought to pursue towards the Arabs in Israel, only 6 per cent concurred with the present policy of control, 60 per cent desired equality and integration, 23 per cent wished Arabs to be allowed to organize independently and share power, and only 11 per cent demanded a separate legal status as in the autonomy plan. Feeling that they have poorer chances of achieving equality and integration under the existing circumstances, Arabs by a large majority opposed the Jewish-Zionist character of the state. To illustrate, 57 per cent were confident that Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state has no right to exist and 30 per cent were unsure about
this right; 61 per cent viewed Zionism as racist and 24 per cent were unsure; 82 per cent thought that Israel should not retain a Jewish majority and 94 per cent favoured the repeal or modification of the Law of Return; etc. They were, however, evenly split on the question whether Arabs can live as equal citizens in Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state and identify themselves with the state.

These and other statistics show that Arabs are diametrically opposed to the present domination and are interested, instead, in either individual incorporation or moderate consociationalism. These preferences are evidenced in the desire for reducing institutional separation of neighbourhoods and schools, acquiring control of Arab institutions but short of regional autonomy, and having a representative leadership officially recognized by the state.

The majority of Jews, on the other hand, insist on continued domination. For 14 per cent of them the only acceptable settlement of the Arab problem is complete exclusion, 48 per cent would tolerate Arabs only if they were resigned to a minority status in a state designed for Jews, 34 per cent were willing to have Arabs as a national minority with equal rights and just 3 per cent consented to the idea of equal status in a non-Jewish state. Answering the question of policy towards the Arabs, 32 per cent were for the status quo, 41 per cent for the increase in surveillance, 22 per cent for equality and integration and only 6 per cent for allowing Arabs to organize independently or have autonomy.

It is thus clear that continuing control is the first choice of the majority of Jews whereas Arab individual incorporation or consociationalism are not considered viable alternatives. To cite only a little of the available evidence for this generalization, in a response to specific questions, 62 per cent of the Jews advocated the increase of surveillance over Arabs. Only 17 per cent agreed to let Arabs organize and pursue their vital interests in the same way as religious Jews in Israel do. Eighty-four per cent were certain that Israel should prefer Jews to Arabs and 57 per cent would give precedence to the Jewish-Zionist character of the state when it collides with the democratic-egalitarian ethos. Jews are so accustomed to domination that they do not mind working with Arabs, but only 30 per cent were prepared to have an Arab as a superior.

Another national representative survey of the Israeli Jewish adult population, taken in January 1980, reveals a similar picture (Tzemah, 1980). To quote only highlights, 67 per cent of the respondents agreed that Jews must show a favourable attitude towards minorities. Yet while 90 per cent held that Israel should wage a struggle on behalf of persecuted Jewish minorities, only 56 per cent thought the same with regard to persecuted non-Jewish minorities. At the same time, 48 per cent favoured equal rights for Arabs in Israel, and the proportion of those endorsing equal treatment for Arabs and Jews in specific areas ranged from 32 per cent regarding jobs in the private market or loans to agricultural development to 15 per cent regarding high posts in government offices. Whereas a majority of 72 per cent would oppose the admission to university of Arabs in Israel who openly express their
dissatisfaction with Israel's existence but do not agitate to take actions against it, 74 per cent would not justify the denial of university admissions or jobs to Jewish candidates in Russia on grounds of anti-Soviet declarations or a wish to immigrate to Israel. For 76 per cent of the respondents, national security is a sufficient basis for imposing restrictions on Arabs.

Along with the majority that clings to the status quo of domination, there is a minority favouring equality, integration or partial consociationalism. These liberal Jews tend to be more leftist, dovish and educated than the average. But given their concern over Zionism and national security, they are sympathetic yet fall short of supporting an alternative policy. Lustick is right, therefore, in observing that there is no 'political base for a Jewish leadership committed to changing the fundamental terms of the relationship between Arabs and Jews in Israel', and that in the absence of such a constituency, 'the guided transformation of Israel toward a consociational or pluralist society will not take place' (1980: 271).

Conclusions

Over the past thirty years, Israel tried to cope, using varying mechanisms of domination, with the difficult problem of an Arab minority having culture, identity, community, resources and, above all, a non-Zionist ideology significantly differing from those of the Jewish majority. It managed to neutralize Arabs as a threat to national security and the Jewish-Zionist nature of the state as well as to harness their services in manpower, lands and other resources.

The conditions conducive to the use of domination instead of more voluntary means were disagreement on basic values, few cross-cutting affiliations, the lack of an objective need of Arab participation in the regime thanks to the existence of a permanent Jewish majority, a sense of threat among Jews, a belief that the control of the Arab minority will contain the danger and the special vulnerability of Arabs which makes possible the cheap and efficient administration of domination. Under these complex circumstances, domination is a more effective means of buying peace than the less practical ways of consensus-building and consociational partnership.

Since these conditions are still in effect today, it is not surprising that the domination policy has remained largely unchanged for years. It is reasonable to assume that as long as (a) no revision is made to the exclusionary ideology of a Jewish-Zionist state in which there is no real room for Arabs, (b) the Israeli-Arab conflict endures to sustain the basic Jewish mistrust and legitimates the inferior and dominated status of Arabs in Israel and (c) the machinery of control continues to keep order at a low cost, no significant change in the present policy should be expected.

When the domination policy encounters difficulties the establishment responds by seeking to remedy it through different kinds of reforms. During the 1970s, many liberal reforms were suggested. As a whole, they do little more than tinker with the status quo in which limited steps to increase equality
and integration are employed as a means of control. Most of the recommendations were, however, disregarded because they involve a higher economic price that Jews are not yet prepared to pay. This is witnessed by the resignation in January 1979 of the Likud-appointed Prime Minister's Advisor on Arab Affairs after he realized that the government was unwilling to discuss his policy reforms (Sharon, 1979). Since then, the Likud government has embarked on a strong-arm course implementing hardline reforms and resorting to a direct political regulation of Arab behaviour.

Given the great potential for disruptive conflict in Israel, there is a need for redirecting Arab-Jewish relations. It is hence vital to formulate alternative policies along lines of consensus-building and consociationalism. The three options presented here ('maximal incorporation', 'status of a Palestinian national minority' and 'personal choice between integration and separation') are not the only possibilities, and other alternatives can definitely be drawn. All of them take into account the constraints of a Jewish-Zionist state, security imperatives and the nonassimilating status of Arabs. It is granted that these options are not viable for the time being, but they may become so in the future.

The existing and alternative policy presents Israeli society with a number of difficult dilemmas. First, it raises the question regarding the nature of Israeli democracy. Shapira characterizes democracy in Israel as being formal in which certain procedures (elections, freedom of organization by opposition parties and freedom of expression) are regarded as supreme values and as the embodiment of representative government. Democracy is not, however, viewed as the care of individual and minority rights and as the restriction of state power to defend them (1977: 191). This critique holds true for the Jewish population, and is far removed from the drastic shrinkage of Israeli democracy vis-à-vis the Arab minority. As far as Arabs are concerned, in addition to the lack of protection of minority rights and the unrestricted powers of the regime, there is the problem of 'the tyranny of the majority' and the excessive use of state power to subdue the minority. All this done while abiding by the formal rules of free expression, freedom of organization and the right to vote. The Arab minority puts Israeli democracy to a critical test in which it does not greatly succeed, as evidenced by the institutionalization of the domination policy.

No less grave is the dilemma of Israel's national identity. If Israel is a Jewish-Zionist state, that is, an entity for serving Jews and a political instrument to achieve the goals of the international Zionist movement, the Arab status within it is not clear. There is no internal ideological answer to this question. The solutions of de-Zionization or population transfer are consistent but utopian. The way Israel handles the problem is by institutionalizing the Jewish-Zionist nature of the state, thereby forcing the Arab minority to pay the costs.

An additional dilemma concerns national security. The central question is whether security in Israel is so overriding as to warrant the neglect of painful internal problems and the delay of their treatment. The security hazard is still
perceived as a sufficient ground for freezing the status quo of domination over a 'hostile' minority and for the unwillingness to seek more liberal relations. The question arises, however, whether internal peace, like external peace, can be acquired without risk-taking and without paying a price.

There is also a pragmatic dilemma. The critical question refers to the life expectancy of the machinery of control over Arabs in Israel. The authorities feel that the Arabs are a time bomb and that a showdown is inevitable. They act to postpone the explosion for as long as possible. The historical experience indeed shows that in domination situations a confrontation between a minority and a majority is endemic though not always violent. If successful, the process of peace-making in the middle East, while it will remove some barriers for coexistence and boost mutual acceptance, will provide Arabs in Israel with legitimacy for their struggle against domination and for equality in rights and resources. If conflict is expected to intensify, why should Israel continue with a policy which is bound to exacerbate conflict further instead of trying another direction?

In this connection a political dilemma comes to mind regarding the special role of policy and leadership in shaping social processes. Is the status of the Arab minority really determined by external factors outside Israel's ambit which make policy change pointless? Is it not the great test of policy like that towards Arabs in Israel to cope with problems which seem intractable - whether because they are built in the very structure of the society, moulded by historical forces or protected by a wall of strongly vested interests? If leadership does not have a popular mandate for change, as is the case with the Jewish leadership, why not attempt to create a mandate? If politics is the art of the possible, how can the possible and impossible be disentangled before putting them to the test of reality? Do not deeply divided societies like Israel enjoy a wide margin of indeterminacy which provides policy with room for manoeuvre and opportunities for breakthroughs?

Last, but not least, is a sharp dilemma regarding the moral fibre of Israeli society. Domination over a minority for a long time and as an institutionalized machinery raises severe ethical queries. The question is especially grave concerning the Jewish people, who themselves have suffered for centuries from the status of a vulnerable minority and only in the last generation were the victims of a vicious scheme of extermination. The moral dilemma is even greater in the light of the continued peculiar situation of the Jews today, most of whom still live as minorities in many countries. Furthermore, Israel aspires to defend the Jewish minorities, to build a new Jewish society based on social justice and to fulfil the historical mission of setting an example to other nations.

Notes

* The support of the Ford Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
1. Lustick (1980) offers the most thoughtful, systematic analysis of the policy towards Arabs in Israel. He discusses control of Arabs on three levels - structural,
institutional and programmatic - of which the last one concerns specific policies of the regime. This paper has gained in insight from Lustick’s analysis.

2. In this connection Toledano (1969) commented:

The deterrent capability lies in a wider use of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations and not in imposing a military government which is not a deterrent without the application of the Defence Regulations. It is possible to declare a curfew in an Israeli Arab village (as has recently been done in Kfar Sulam near Afula), to close areas and to ban entry, to arrest people, to restrict or confine them, to demolish houses and to lay down a policy of permits. All this can be done without reinstating the military government.

3. The close link between the mechanisms of economic dependence and political control is explicit in the ‘Policy of Reward and Punishment’ which has underpinned the domination policy for many years. In one policy document some of the means used are specified as follows:

1. The dispensation of personal favours to positive elements and withholding them from negative ones. 2. The fostering of leaders in different ranks by allocating benefits through them. 3. The provision of preferential treatment to religious groups like the Druzes, Circassians and Christian sects or ‘positive’ villages in social and economic development according to the degree of their integration into the state. 4. The punishment of ‘negative’ persons and bodies by withholding benefits from them. (Israel Labour Party, 1973)

It is further stressed that ‘the democratic character of the state does not allow an effective application of this policy without exposure to a public or judicial criticism’.

4. The survey was based on a national interview sample of 1,185 Arabs representing all Arabs aged sixteen years and over living in Israel, within the pre-1967 borders (excluding residents of East Jerusalem). A parallel national representative sample of 1,267 Jews was also taken. The fieldwork for both samples, along with complementary interview samples of ninety leaders from each population, was completed in July 1980 and was funded by the Ford Foundation. Some findings from this study will be quoted below. For similar findings of an earlier survey, conducted in 1976, see Smooha, 1980b.

5. These alternatives are taken, with some modification, from my book, 1978: 249-51.

6. Two proposals along the lines of the alternative of maximal incorporation were published. One is by Kook and Merlin (1975) and is general but has weighty implications for the status of Arabs in Israel, and the second by Rosenzweig (1977), one of the leaders of the Shutafut (Partnership) Movement (‘Union for Creating Conditions of Partnership between Arabs and Jews’).

7. Hilf (1979: 48) maintains that the provision of a separate legal status for Arabs in Israel is an integral component in the resolution of the Palestinian problem. Collective legal rights may include, inter alia, proportional representation in the Knesset, in the government and in the civil service, officially recognized Arab representation and institutional autonomy in certain areas. During the inter-war period, the League of Nations widely used a separate legal status as a means of tackling the rampant problem of national minorities in Europe. For instance, Polish Jews waged a struggle and to a large extent managed to gain official status as a national minority (Netzer, 1980). The policy of the United Nations since 1945 shifted the emphasis, however, from protection of minority collective rights to individual human rights because of the tremendous obstacles the previous policy had faced.

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