

Jewish and Arab ethnocentrism in Israel

Sammy Smooha

University of Haifa

Introduction

Sumner (1906), in a classic essay, considers ethnocentrism as a universal syndrome of attitudes and behavior. The 'ingroup' sees itself as virtuous and superior and the 'outgroup' as contemptible and inferior, it sanctions association with its own members and dissociation with others, loves and trusts insiders and hates and distrusts outsiders, and so forth (LeVine and Campbell, 1972). Ethnocentrism is essential for the survival of the group and for keeping its distinct identity, culture, solidarity and ability to compete successfully with other groups. Although they simplify and distort reality, group preconceptions and prejudices provide the individual with a sense of direction and belonging. This perspective regards ethnocentrism as a permanent, functional, positive and universal group feature. It stands in contrast with the more common and critical approach which conceives of ethnocentrism as an antonym for cultural relativism and human equality, and identifies it with intolerance, chauvinism and racism.

These competing conceptions emphasise different components of ethnocentrism, where a simple test of proportion and plausibility would produce more balanced and realistic appraisals. To be ethnocentric, attitudes must contain an excessive or unjustified element of superiority, rejection or hostility toward an outgroup. For instance, mistrust is not ethnocentric if it is firmly grounded in facts; objection to intermarriage is not prejudicial if minority and majority agree on separation. Judiciousness is therefore necessary for establishing a case of ethnocentrism. The task of examining each case is rather complex because ethnocentrism may manifest itself on individual and institutional levels. Spontaneous, personal ethnocentrism consists of an aggregate set of individual attitudes and behaviours, whereas organized, ideological ethnocentrism refers to public policies and institutional practices (Lanternari, 1980). Both forms should be explored. One should also look into the ethnocentrism of both sides of the ethnic divide. It is a long-standing tradition in the literature of intergroup relations to concentrate solely on the ethnocentrism of the dominant group because it is more freely expressed, entrenched and consequen-

Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 10 Number 1 January 1987

@R.K.P. 1987 0141-9870/86/1001-0001 \$2/1

tial. There is little ground, however, to expect less ethnocentrism from non-dominant groups.

Turning to ethnocentrism in Israel, it draws its most virulent expressions from the division between Arabs and Jews. The 600,000 Arab citizens (15% of the population of Israel in its pre-1967 borders) are a restive minority, on the rise demographically, as well as in the socio-economic and political spheres. The Arab resurgence causes widespread apprehension among the Jewish majority. Jews are alarmed by the Israeli Arabs' Palestinian identity, support for the PLO, voting for anti-Zionist parties, general strikes, nationalistically-motivated murders of Jews, and the like.

The growing Jewish fears of the mounting Arab militancy were exploited to form the first genuine fascist movement in Israel, Rabbi Kahane's Kach, which won 25,907 votes (1.2% of the total) in the 1984 national elections. In his book *They Must Go*, Kahane (1981) maintains that in a Jewish state, which is intentionally geared to serve Jews, Arabs are bound to suffer discrimination, to become alienated and antagonistic, and hence the only solution is to get rid of them. He attracts the underclass, the youth, and the ultra-nationalistic fringe groups, whose combined power in Israeli society is far from being negligible. Kahane's fascist politics, along with the 1975 U.N. resolution equating Zionism with racism, have brought the question of ethnocentrism in Israel to national and international attention.

For a number of reasons a significant degree of ethnocentrism should be expected in the relations between the Arab minority and Jewish majority. First, the Israeli-Arab conflict places Arabs in the position of a distrustful, hostile minority. Second, the cultural differences in language, nationality, religion and lifestyle between Arabs and Jews make for a sense of estrangement and disdain. Third, interethnic contacts are hindered by the agreement on both sides that assimilation is impossible. Fourth, the appreciable ethnic stratification adds a class barrier to ethnic separation. Fifth, the Jewish-Zionist character of the state nurtures reluctance to share privileges and rights with non-Jews and non-Zionists. And sixth, feelings of dominance, mistrust and mutual rejection are bound to stem from the ongoing application of the machinery of control over Arabs. These conditions combine to make ethnocentrism an independent force and a distinct issue in Arab-Jewish relations. (For a review of these structural factors, see Lustick, 1980; Zureik, 1979; and Smooha, 1984.)

Discussion of ethnocentrism in Israel is based either on social psychological studies of stereotypes and social distance (Peres, 1971; Robins, 1972; Amir, 1979; Hofman, 1982) or on general statements about intolerance and racism (e.g., Lam, 1983). None of the attitude studies was based on a representative sample of the adult Arab or Jewish population. Furthermore, no serious attempt was made to arrive at a realistic assessment of ethnocentrism by integrating the individual

and institutional levels. It is the aim of the present study to correct these two failings.

Data

The study draws on two surveys. The first one was conducted in January 1980 by Tsemah ('Tsemah's survey'). Data were gathered through interviews with 1223 Jews, representing the urban adult Jewish population. Tsemah's survey focused on the Jewish public's attitudes towards the Arab minority. (For a full report, see Tsemah, 1980.)

The second survey was carried out in July 1980 by Smooha ('Smooha's survey'). It draws on interviews with 1267 Jews and 1140 Arabs who represented the entire Israeli adult population within the pre-1967 borders.¹ It covered various issues dividing Arabs and Jews (For a full report, see Smooha, forthcoming.)²

Smooha's survey also included 178 interviews with some 30 public figures who represent each of the following six different political streams:

- (1) Establishment-affiliated Arab leaders: Arab functionaries in the separate Arab departments in government offices and the Histadrut, Arabs active in Zionist political parties and heads of Arab local governments identified with the authorities. This is obviously an accommodating leadership group.
- (2) Rakah-affiliated Arab leaders: Arabs who hold ranking positions in or offices on behalf of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE) which is dominated by the Israeli Communist Party (Rakah). These leaders are anti-Zionist, militant in the struggle of Arab civil rights and supporters of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.
- (3) Rejectionist Arab leaders: Arabs who are active in the Progressive National Movement and Sons of the Village Movement which are involved in student and local politics. They reject the State of Israel and wish to see it replaced by a democratic-secular state in the entire area of Palestine.
- (4) Dovish Jewish leaders: influential Zionist Jews in Sheli (radical Zionist leftist party), Mapam, Labor, Shinui, the Civil Rights Movement, and Peace Now who have 'a dovish reputation'.
- (5) Hawkish Jewish leaders: influential Zionist Jews in the Tehiya party (an ultra-nationalist party which includes secularists and Gush Emunim who are committed to Greater Israel and opposed to the Peace Treaty with Egypt), and top figures in the National Religious Party and Likud who have 'a hawkish reputation'.
- (6) Jewish Arabists: Jewish high officials who run the separate Arab departments and other Jewish politicians or functionaries who are directly associated with Arab minority affairs. In their political outlooks they fall in between the Jewish doves and hawks.

The interviews in both surveys were administered in full confidentiality to Arabs in Arabic by Arab interviewers, and to Jews in Hebrew by Jewish interviewers. A standard questionnaire was used. Non-response was usually under 3% and was ignored in the data-analysis.³

All the questionnaire items relevant to ethnocentrism were attitudinal. They were classified into four areas: stereotyping, mistrust, avoidance and differential treatment. They will be first discussed in this order and then evaluated for their implications concerning the prevalence of ethnocentrism in Israel.

Stereotyping

Arabs and Jews should not be expected to share similar stereotypes because they differ markedly in their status vis-à-vis each other. Arabs would stereotype Jews as a modern group in control of another group whereas Jews would stereotype Arabs as a backward and potentially violent group (Peres and Levy, 1969).

Stereotypes of Jews by Arabs are in fact widespread.⁴ A majority of Arabs regarded most Jews as mindless of self-respect and family honor, exploitative and racist (Table 1). These negative Jewish images were even sharper among the rejectionist Arab leaders, but shared only by a sizable minority of the other Arab leaders. Arabs probably had in mind the Ashkenazic Jews as a prototype of the Israeli Jew whom they perceived as modern and devoid of human decency. These Israeli Arab beliefs draw extra significance from their consistency with the Arab vision of Israel as racist, namely, Jewish individuals, the Government and Zionism are all condemned to be racist.

Stereotypes of Arabs by Jews are well established but less common

Table 1. *Arabs' stereotypes of Jews*

	Arab Public	Establish- ment- Affiliated Arab Leaders	Rakah- Affiliated Arab Leaders	Rejec- ionist Arab Leaders
Agree that most Jews do not value self-respect and family honour	75.2	45.8	37.9	83.3
Agree that most Jews are exploitative	69.5	32.0	32.1	80.6
Agree that most Jews are racist	69.1	36.0	40.7	90.3

Source: Smooha's survey.

Table 2. *Jews' stereotypes of Arabs*

	Jewish Public	Dovish Jewish Leaders	Jewish Arabists	Hawkish Jewish Leaders
Agree that most Arabs in Israel will never reach the level of development Jews had reached	43.6	11.8	10.0	17.4
Agree that most Arabs in Israel are primitive	38.2	2.9	0.0	4.0

Source: Smooha's survey.

Table 3. *Jews' stereotypes of israeli Arabs, Israeli Jews and Americans*

	Israeli Arab	Israeli Jew	American
Progress:			
Primitive	43.8	5.5	2.8
Developed	22.1	76.8	89.2
Neither	34.2	17.7	8.0
Violence:			
Violent	38.7	22.2	12.4
Non-violent	21.7	34.7	51.9
Neither	39.6	43.1	35.6
Cleanliness:			
Dirty	31.7	8.1	8.5
Clean	18.7	46.7	55.1
Neither	49.5	45.1	36.4
Efficiency:			
Inefficient	30.2	8.7	2.9
Efficient	34.5	58.5	81.5
Neither	35.3	32.8	15.6
Industrious:			
Lazy	21.6	28.3	11.4
Industrious	41.9	27.8	64.3
Neither	36.5	43.9	24.3

Source: Tsemah's survey.

than one would expect. Around two-fifths of the Jews envisioned most Arabs as primitive or incapable of reaching the Jewish level of development, but only a few Jewish leaders held this image (Table.2). The adverse portrait of the Arabs stood out in contrast with that of the 'Israeli Jew' and 'American'. While 44% of the Jewish respondents stereotyped Israeli Arabs as primitive, only 5.5% so envisaged Israeli Jews and only 3% so perceived Americans (Table 3). The Jewish public is quite discriminate. Its self-image is dimmer than that of the Americans (probably constituting a positive reference group). Between 22% to 44% of the Israeli Jews regarded Israeli Arabs as primitive, violent, dirty, inefficient and lazy, but the majority either took a neutral view (between 34% to 49.5%), or even had a positive picture (between 19% to 42%).

Mistrust

Mutual mistrust is a graver problem than stereotyping. Two-thirds of the Arabs in the study felt that it is impossible to trust most Israeli Jews,

Table 4. *Arabs' mistrust of Jews in Israel*

	Arab Public	Establish- ment- Affiliated Arab Leaders	Rakah- Affiliated Arab Leaders	Rejec- ionist Arab Leaders
It is impossible to trust most Jews:				
Agree	66.2	24.0	31.0	89.7
Disagree	33.8	76.0	69.0	10.3
Most trustworthy news- papers and broadcasts:				
Official, non-partisan Israeli newspapers and broadcasts	59.0	70.8	25.8	10.0
Israeli newspapers of the Jewish left	5.8	29.2	6.5	10.0
Rakah newspapers	8.1	0.0	61.3	15.0
Non-Israeli newspapers and broadcasts from the occupied territories, Arab States, or Europe	27.1	0.0	6.5	65.0

Source: Smoocha's survey.

a distrust that was shared by a quarter to a third of the Arab leaders who are affiliated with the establishment and Rakah and by virtually all of the rejectionist leaders (Table 4). That Arabs are quite discerning in their distrust of Jews is demonstrated by the fact that a majority (59%) of them trust official or Jewish media more than other sources of information (including Rakah newspapers and non-Israeli sources).

Why do Arabs mistrust Jews but not the Jewish media? The Israeli Jewish media, catering to Jews, are known for their high professional standards, and hence are seen as superior to the propagandistic and less informative Arab sources (e.g. the Rakah newspaper). They are credible because, unlike the Jewish public, Zionism and the Government, they are not associated in the Arab Israeli mind with manipulation, control and exploitation. The Arab cannot confide in his fellow Jew whom he believes to be racist and cannot fearlessly share with him his dissenting views and hostile sentiments.

Jewish mistrust hinges on Arab threats to Israel's survival, and spreads to other areas. A majority of both the Jewish public and leadership regarded the Arab minority as presenting at least a certain danger to national security (Table 5). This apprehension led two-thirds of the Jewish public to believe that it is impossible to trust most Arabs like the two-thirds of the Arab public who cannot trust most Jews. In consequence, the Jewish population desires an increase in surveillance over Arabs, justifies security restrictions on Arabs, endorses a dismissal from the civil service and universities of Arabs who publicly support the PLO and generally approves of a strong-arm policy to contain the Arab minority (Table 5). The Jewish leaders hold more differentiating stands - they see only a minority of Arabs as untrustworthy and a target for a closer watch. They differ, nonetheless, on how widely security restrictions should be imposed and on how Arab dissenters must be handled. On this point the hawkish leaders take a hard-line stance similar to that of the public-at-large.

Mistrust raises the question of Arab loyalty to the state. Since Arabs are suspected of undermining the state, loyalty would mean, first of all, acceptance of Israel's presence as well as undivided allegiance and compliance with the law. Our figures clearly show that Arab loyalty is indeed a critical issue in Arab-Jewish relations.

Arabs and Jews disagree sharply on their assessment of the Israeli Arab acquiescence to Israel. 68% Of the Arabs agreed that most or almost all Arabs have already reconciled themselves to Israel's existence (Table 6). This proportion was even higher than the 59% of Arabs who recognized Israel's right to exist without reservation (Smootha's survey). Most importantly, even amongst the rejectionist Arab leaders, of whom none unreservedly acknowledged Israel's right to exist, 59% felt that Arabs are already resigned to Israeli existence. A large majority (72%) of the Jews disbelieved this across-the-board Arab consensus on the Arab acceptance of the state.

Table 5. *Jews' mistrust of Arabs in Israel*

	Jewish Public	Dovish Jewish Leaders	Jewish Arabists	Hawkish Jewish Leaders
Arabs in Israel as a danger to national security:				
To a great degree	41.0	6.3	20.0	12.0
To a certain degree	42.5	50.0	40.0	44.0
No	16.5	43.8	40.0	44.0
Agree that it is impossible to trust most Arabs in Israel	66.0	15.2	10.7	31.8
Favor an increase in surveillance over most Arabs in Israel	65.4	0.0	27.6	35.0
Consider as justified security restrictions on Arabs in Israel as long as the Israel- Arab conflict persists	67.6	29.4	48.3	72.0
Endorse a law to dismiss a civil servant or a university student who publicly declares support for the PLO	79.3	39.4	58.6	96.0
Strong-arm policy toward the Arabs in Israel:				
In favour	46.5	0.0	26.9	42.9
Have reservations	33.7	37.5	46.2	47.6
Against	19.8	62.5	26.9	9.5

Source: Smooha's survey.

Although both sides realize that undivided allegiance to Israel on the part of the Arabs is not a realistic expectation under the present circumstances, they differ on its implications. On the one hand, the question whether Arabs are torn between loyalty to Israel and loyalty to their people deeply divides Arabs and Jews with about half in each community feeling either way. On the other hand, for the Jews, split allegiance casts a shadow on Arab loyalty to Israel, whereas for at least half of the Arab public and most of the Arab leaders (except the rejectionists) Arab loyalty to the state remains firm in the face of countervailing pressures. Furthermore, at least half of the Jews

Table 6. *Arabs loyalty in Arabs' and Jews' eyes*

	Arab Public	Establish- ment- Affiliated Arab Leaders	Rakah- Affiliated Arab Leaders	Rejec- tionist Arab Leaders	Jewish Public
Consider the following statements true for all or most Arabs in Israel:					
Reconciled themselves to Israel's existence	68.2	84.0	96.9	58.6	28.2
Torn in loyalty to Israel and to their people	47.6	52.0	42.9	3.3	45.2
Loyal to Israel	47.0	87.5	65.5	0.0	16.2
Rejoice at Israel's suffering	25.4	0.0	3.3	90.0	50.7
Hate Jews	28.6	4.2	0.0	32.3	53.5
Engaged in spying against Israel		Not asked			17.6

Source: Smooha's survey, except the responses of the Jewish public which are taken from Tsemah's survey.

suspected that most or all Arabs hate them or rejoice at Israel's suffering but only a small proportion of the Arabs confirmed this suspicion.

No evidence is available on Jewish public beliefs concerning Arab obedience to the law. The general impression is, however, that many Jews believe that Arabs are disproportionately engaged in illegal activities, including tax evasion, squatting on state lands, construction of unlicensed buildings and collaboration with the enemy. Responses to a question on the last point are symptomatic. 18% of the Jews believed that most or almost all Arabs perpetrate espionage against Israel and an additional 22% charged that a certain part of the Arabs do so. Given the impossibility of these imputations, these exceedingly high figures demonstrate once again fundamental Jewish mistrust of Arabs.

Avoidance

Lack of readiness to maintain contact with members of the outside group may be, but is not necessarily, a sign of ethnocentrism. The degree of willingness to participate in interethnic associations usually varies with minority-majority status and the quality of the relationship. Arabs and Jews were asked about their willingness to mix with members of the opposite community in friendship and to live with them in the same neighbourhood, both of which require relationships on a personal level. For being fully legitimate and less demanding, mixed friendship was completely supported by both Arab and Jewish leaders (Table 7 and Table 8). The rank and file were less receptive, with 69% of the Arabs

and 38.5% of the Jews expressing willingness to make friends with members of the opposite community. Less readiness was shown by both sides to live in mixed neighbourhoods because they necessitate daily contact and reorganization of local facilities. Yet most of the Jewish leaders as well as over half of the Arab leaders were willing to live in a mixed neighbourhood, thereby conferring legitimacy on such type of interethnic mixing. About half of the Arabs as compared to one-fifth of the Jews stated their willingness to reside in mixed neighbourhoods.

The Jewish public was presented with eleven contact situations ranging from the workplace to the family. A majority of 53% to 64% were willing to work with Arabs, to host them, to have Arab friends, to visit them, or even to have their children study with Arab children (Table 9). 42% were prepared to live in a street with Arabs and 36% to live in a building with them. However, only 6.5% were inclined to have a family member marry an Arab.

Several avoidance patterns emerge from the above statistics. First, Arabs and Jews exhibit greater willingness for mixed contacts than they have had at present. To illustrate, the proportion of Arabs willing to have Jewish friends (69%) (Table 7) is twice as much as that of Arabs being on visiting terms with Jewish friends (38%) (Smoooha's survey). A similar picture prevails among the Jews (the respective figures were 38.5% and 12%). The 47% of the Arabs and 22% of the Jews prepared to live in a mixed neighbourhood is much greater than the 3% or less who presently share residential quarters.

Second, the same figures demonstrate the asymmetry in Arab and Jewish readiness for interethnic contact. The fact that Arabs desire more contacts with Jews than the other way around is well established in research (Hofman, 1977:94). It is best accounted for by the greater rewards accruing to the minority members from interethnic contacts, whereas majority members might even lose from such contacts.

And third, willingness is greater when contact is impersonal or temporary and much less when it is personal and lasting. Whatever appears to threaten the separate existence and identity of each group is resisted. For this reason most Arabs and most Jews object to neighbourly relations⁵ and intermarriages.

Differential treatment

At the core of the ethnocentrism of the dominant group is its reluctance to treat the minority as an equal. Differential treatment can be expressed in the denial of civil rights and in the imposition of restrictions.

Although Arabs formally enjoy complete civil rights in Israel, the Jewish public does not fully sanction the current situation. Only half favoured the same rights for Arabs and Jews, and three-fifths favoured the same duties (Table 10). Interestingly enough, over one-tenth of the

Table 7. *Arabs' readiness for contact with Jews*

	Arab Public	Establish- ment- Affiliated Arab Leaders	Rakah- Affiliated Arab Leaders	Rejec- ionist Arab Leaders
Willingness to have Jews as friends	69.4	100.0	100.0	83.9
Willingness to live in a mixed neighbourhood	47.4	52.0	53.1	64.5

Source: Smooh's survey.

Table 8. *Jews' readiness for contact with Arabs*

	Jewish Public	Dovish Jewish Leaders	Jewish Arabists	Hawkish Jewish Leaders
Willingness to have Arabs as friends	38.5	100.0	96.6	88.0
Willingness to live in a mixed neighbourhood	22.4	58.1	75.0	60.8

Source: Smooh's survey.

Table 9. *Jews' readiness for contact with Israeli Arabs*

	Willing
Common workplace	64.4
Working with an Arab in same room	60.6
Hosting Arabs at one's home	59.1
Freindship with Arabs	58.3
Visiting Arabs	57.9
Attending social gatherings with Arabs	54.9
Living in a city with Arabs	54.0
One's children studying with Arab children	53.0
Living in a street with Arabs	42.4
Living in a building with Arabs	36.4
One's family member marrying an Arab	6.5

Source: Tsemah's survey.

Table 10. *Jews' attitudes towards equal rights and duties for Arabs*

Jewish Public	
Israel should grant Arabs same rights as Jews:	
In favour	47.3
Indifferent	14.8
Against	37.9
Israel should impose same duties on Arabs as Jews:	
In favour	60.8
Indifferent	12.2
Against	26.9

Source: Tsemah's survey

Table 11. *Arabs' attitude towards equal treatment*

	Arab Public	Establish- ment- Affiliated Arab Leaders	Rakah- Affiliated Arab Leaders	Rejec- tionist Arab Leaders
The State of Israel should:				
Prefer Jews to Arabs considerably	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Prefer Jews to Arabs to some extent	1.7	4.2	0.0	0.0
Treat both equally	91.3	95.8	100.0	100.0
Prefer Arabs to Jews to some extent	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
Prefer Arabs to Jews considerably	3.9	0.0	0.0	0.0

Source: Smooha's survey.

Jews would impose the same duties on Arabs without granting them the same rights.

More revealing were the Jewish responses to the question as to whether Israel should treat both groups equally or differentially. While 91% of the Arab respondents predictably endorsed 'equal treatment' (Table 11), an overwhelming majority, 84% of the Jews, were for giving Jews 'preference', consisting of 68% opting for 'considerable preference' and 16% for 'some preference' (Table 12). In addition, 28.5% of the dovish Jewish leaders, 50% of the Jewish Arabists and 55% of the

Table 12. *Jews' attitude towards equal treatment*

	Jewish Public	Dovish Jewish Leaders	Jewish Arabists	Hawkish Jewish Leaders
The State of Israel should:				
Prefer Jews to Arabs considerably	67.6	7.1	19.2	36.4
Prefer Jews to Arabs to some extent	16.3	21.4	30.8	18.2
Treat both equally	15.8	71.4	46.2	45.5
Prefer Arabs to Jews to some extent	0.3	0.0	3.8	0.0
Prefer Arabs to Jews considerably	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0

Source: Smootha's survey.

Table 13. *Jews' attitudes towards equal treatment of Arabs in selected areas*

	Jewish Public
Reject equal treatment of Arabs (or favouring preferential treatment of Jews) in the following areas:	
Admission to universities	72.3
Admission to private workplaces	69.2
Admission to public workplaces	74.2
Housing assistance to large families	73.5
Social security allowances	68.1
Loans for development of agriculture	70.0
Senior posts in governmental offices	85.9

Source: Tsemah's survey.

hawkish Jewish leaders favoured preference of the Jews by the state (a possibility which was opposed by all Arab leaders).

Jewish expectations of preferential treatment are best seen in their support of specific practices which benefit them. A Jewish majority ranging from 68% to 86% endorsed preference for Jews in various areas, including admission to universities, jobs, housing assistance, agricultural loans and social security benefits (Table 13).

Table 14. *Jews reserved or opposed to measures to increase Arab equality*

	Jewish Public	Dovish Jewish Leaders	Jewish Arabists	Hawkish Jewish Leaders
Extension to Arab villages same special assistance given to Jewish development towns	75.0	36.6	66.7	72.0
Extension to Arab schools same special assistance given to culturally disadvantaged Hebrew schools	59.0	13.3	26.7	36.0
Admission of Arab university graduates to private and public sectors of the economy	61.8	3.0	20.6	33.3
Doing away with benefits given to army veterans or to their relatives	84.5	76.7	90.0	96.0
Allocation of lands and funds to establish new Arab towns	89.2	48.4	80.0	80.0
Enacting a special and punitive law against discrimination of Arabs in jobs, housing assistance, etc.	75.2	43.8	60.0	66.7
Modifying state's symbols like the flag and anthem so that Arabs can identify themselves with them	97.2	94.1	100.0	100.0

Source: Smooha's survey.

Similarly, 59% to 97% of the Jewish public were reserved about or opposed to different measures that are intended to equalize Arab and Jewish statuses (Table 14). To illustrate, 75% were reserved about or opposed to the extension to Arab schools of the same special aid given to disadvantaged Jewish schools, or were unfavourable towards the free entry of educated Arabs into the economy. Furthermore, over 90% disapproved of innovative steps such as the allocation of lands and funds to establish new Arab towns or to modify the state's symbols, like the

Table 15. *Jews' attitudes towards restrictions of Arab civil rights*

	Jewish Public	Dovish Jewish Leaders	Jewish Arabists	Hawkish Jewish Leaders
Denial by the government of Arab right to hold demonstrations:				
Agree	36.0	2.9	14.8	13.0
Have reservations	37.1	32.4	48.1	26.1
Disagree	26.9	64.7	37.0	60.9
Outlawing Rakah:				
Agree	51.7	0.0	10.0	16.0
Have reservations	25.9	14.7	10.0	16.0
Disagree	22.4	85.3	80.0	68.0
Restrictions on Arabs to prevent their increase to a majority in Israel:				
Agree	56.1	10.0	22.2	31.6
Have reservations	25.8	23.3	40.7	15.8
Disagree	18.1	66.7	37.0	52.6
Israel should seek and use any opportunity to encourage Arabs to leave the state:				
Agree	50.3	3.0	21.4	59.1
Have reservations	30.8	21.2	42.9	13.6
Disagree	18.9	75.8	35.7	27.3
Expropriation of Arab lands within the Green Line for Jewish development:				
Agree	40.7	33.3	43.3	87.0
Have reservations	35.4	30.0	40.0	8.7
Disagree	23.9	36.7	16.7	4.3

Source: Smooha's survey.

flag or national anthem, so that Israeli Arabs could identify with them. On most of the proposed measures, the hawkish Jewish leaders and Jewish Arabists took similar stands but the dovish Jewish leaders were generally more receptive to changes that would result in greater Arab equality.

The Jewish public would even condone restrictions on Arab rights and on equal status if these restrictions appeared to be better safeguards against adverse developments. The Jews fear, among other things, that the Arabs might subvert Israeli political democracy, the Arab population growth might undermine the Jewish majority and Arab land holdings might impede Jewish land settlement. To avert these undesirable possibilities, most Jews in the survey supported or at least did not oppose countermeasures like a ban on Rakah, seizure of opportunities to encourage Arabs to leave the country and expropriation of Arab lands for Jewish development projects (Table 15). On the other hand, with the exception of the land issue, the majority of the dovish Jewish leaders opposed these infringements on Arab rights.

Jewish reluctance to extend equality to the Arabs takes a noticeably ethnocentric upturn with regard to acceptance of Arabs with superior social status. Around two-thirds of the Jews were unwilling to have an Israeli Arab as their own personal doctor or superior in a job, thereby confirming their overt stakes in the existing ethno-status hierarchy (Table 16). Probably aware of the explicit ethnocentric nature of these questions, the Jewish leaders gave rather liberal answers.

Table 16. *Jews' readiness to accept Arabs of superior status*

	Jewish Public	Dovish Jewish Leaders	Jewish Arabists	Hawkish Jewish Leaders
Unwilling to have an Arab as one's own:				
Personal doctor	65.0	11.8	6.6	24.0
Superior in a job	70.1	30.3	25.9	36.0

Source: Smooha's survey.

Consistency and variation in ethnocentrism

To what extent are stereotyping, mistrust, avoidance and norms of differential treatment closely linked to produce a consistent syndrome of ethnocentrism? How do Arabs and Jews, and social categories within each of these groups, differ on ethnocentrism? To tackle these questions, the items in Smooha's survey that are either identical or parallel for Arabs and Jews were subjected to further analysis. These items are the following:

- (1) For Arabs: agree that most Jews do not value self-respect and family honour. For Jews: agree that most Arabs in Israel will never reach the level of development Jews had reached.

- (2) For Arabs: agree that most Jews are racist. For Jews: agree that most Arabs in Israel are primitive.
- (3) For Arabs: agree that it is impossible to trust most Jews. For Jews: agree that it is impossible to trust most Arabs in Israel.
- (4) For Arabs: unwilling to have Jews as friends. For Jews: unwilling to have Arabs as friends.
- (5) For Arabs and Jews: unwilling to live in a mixed neighbourhood.

The statistical analysis included the following steps: (a) intercorrelations, (b) index construction, and (c) regression analysis. It led to several conclusions. First, the intercorrelations between the various items were all statistically significant averaging 0.22 for the Arab public and 0.31 for the Jewish public. They indicate moderate consistency in attitudes and justify the notion of an 'ethnocentrism syndrome' for both Arabs and Jews.

Second, a simple additive index, consisting of all the five items, showed no difference in the level of the ethnocentrism, as measured, between the Arab and Jewish public. 18% of the Arabs and 20% of the Jews scored low on the ethnocentrism index (0-1 points), 44% vs. 42% scored medium (2-3 points), and 38% vs. 38% scored high (4-5 points) (Table 17). Assuming that the two indices are based on sufficient equivalence of the items, these figures demonstrate that ethnocentrism is equally high and scattered among Arabs and Jews. At the same time, its meaning and implications might be different for the two sides as will be suggested below.

Table 17. *Index of ethnocentrism*

	Arab Public	Establishment-Affiliated Arab Leaders	Rakah-Affiliated Arab Leaders	Rejectionist Arab Leaders	Jewish Public	Dovish Jewish Leaders	Jewish Arabists	Hawkish Jewish Leaders
Low								
0	5.8	20.0	24.1	3.3	7.4	41.2	51.7	40.9
1	12.5	40.0	27.6	6.7	12.7	44.1	41.4	22.7
2	17.5	16.0	20.7	13.3	19.0	11.8	3.4	13.6
3	26.5	12.0	13.8	43.3	22.6	0.0	3.4	18.2
4	20.9	12.0	13.8	16.7	20.3	2.9	0.0	4.2
5	16.7	0.0	0.0	16.7	17.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
High								

Source: Smooha's survey.

Third, most leaders scored low on the ethnocentrism index and they are much less ethnocentric than the rank and file. 60% of the Arab leaders who are affiliated to the establishment, and 52% of the Arab leaders who are affiliated to Rakah as compared to only 18% of the

Arab public scored low on the index (Table 17). This divergence is even more marked among the Jews. The only exception is the rejectionist Arab leaders who are moderately to highly ethnocentric and even slightly more ethnocentric than the general public.

Fourth, the four best predictors of ethnocentrism differ for Arabs and Jews. For the Arabs they are visiting terms with Jews, effect of land expropriations, dissatisfaction with local educational services, and consent to permit single Arab girls to have a boyfriend, together accounting for 14% of the variance on ethnocentrism ($R = .37$) (Table 18). These predictors fall into two categories: the first three and main ones concern Jews' relations with Arabs or the impact of Jewish policies on Arabs, whereas the last one reflects Arab traditionalism which is associated with suspicion and seclusion.

Table 18. *A regression analysis of the four best predictors of ethnocentrism*

	N	r	R	Beta
Arabs:				
Visiting terms with Jews	1096	-.26	.26	-.22722*
Effect of land expropriations	866	-.20	.32	-.16644*
Dissatisfaction with local educational services	1097	.16	.34	.13988*
Consent to permit single Arab girls to have a boyfriend	1088	.17	.37	.12971*
Jews:				
Voting	928	.33	.33	.22438*
Visiting terms with Arabs	1185	-.24	.40	-.20076*
Education	1187	-.27	.44	-.17998*
Hawkishness	989	-.29	.47	-.17577*

Source: Smooha's survey.

*Statistically significant at .05 level.

The four best predictors, which explain 22% ($R = .47$) of the variance on Jewish ethnocentrism are of a different nature. Two of them, voting and hawkishness, indicate affiliation to a political stream which in turn determines attitudes towards the Arab world and the level of political tolerance. Visiting terms with Arabs which tend to dissipate stereotypes and distrust also emerge as the second best predictor. Despite its correlation with a political stream, education seems to reduce Jewish ethnocentrism a little further. On the other hand, religious observance and ethnic origin do not have a specific or direct contribution to Jewish ethnocentrism beyond their probable impact on voting and on hawkishness.

Evaluation of Arab ethnocentrism

Let me turn now to the difficult task of disentangling the ethnocentric component in the Arab and Jewish views.

It appears that most Arabs in Israel today are indeed moderately to highly ethnocentric. Their images of Jews as racist, exploiters, untrustworthy and devoid of self-dignity and family honour, as well as their reservations about contact with Jews, are at least partially ethnocentric. By not espousing them, most Arab leaders, except the extreme rejectionist ones, acknowledge the ethnocentric nature of these attitudes.

This assessment confirms the findings of a study of civic values of Arab high school students conducted in 1976. It was part of an international comparative study of youth in Western countries (including the United States, France, the Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, Ireland, Finland and New Zealand). The students were asked if each of various categories of peoples (e.g. physicians, industrialists, workers, large families, beggars, critics of the government) should be given the same, less, or more rights than the majority. The proportion of ninth-graders giving straightforward, egalitarian answers averaged 80% among students in the Western countries, 70% among Jewish students in Israel, but only 50% among Arab students in Israel (Rapaport, Peled, Rimor and Mano, 1978: 122-125). On the other hand, the Israeli Arab students showed greater political tolerance than the other groups in the study. To illustrate, 44.8% of the students in the United States, 46.5% of the Israeli Jewish students, but only 26.5% of the Israeli Arab students agreed to deny equal rights to Communists and critics of the regime (*ibid.*: 124). This is because Arab students are aware of the fact that these dissident groups happen to be the champions of Arab minority rights in Israel.

Evaluation of Jewish ethnocentrism

The more extensive and refined data on Jews make possible a more detailed evaluation of Jewish ethnocentrism. A proper assessment should combine two considerations. One is a norm of tolerance which is built into the Judeo-Christian tradition of the Western world. The other consideration is cross-cultural, namely, to be judged realistically and fairly, the Jewish treatment of the Arab minority must be compared to that of minorities elsewhere.

In exploring adequate criteria, two common ones should be dismissed because they ignore either one of the two considerations. One of these untenable yardsticks is pure tolerance in a utopian, secular, democratic state. According to this ideal virtually all Israeli Jews are racist. While this moralistic approach is favored by critics of Israel, the other unreasonable test is favored by staunch apologists for the Jewish state. They maintain that the relevant standard for judging how Arabs are

treated in Israel is the maltreatment of minorities in the Arab world, be they Jewish (especially Syrian Jews) or non-Jewish (like the Kurds in Iraq). This outlook is not only incorrect in overemphasising the degree of intolerance towards minorities in the Middle East (e.g. Jewish status in Morocco is different), but is also pointless because neither Israeli Jews nor Israeli Arabs take the Middle East as a frame of reference in this respect.

By incorporating both tolerance and comparability into the evaluative scheme, it is possible to spell out four valid criteria for assessing Jewish ethnocentrism towards the Arab minority: comparison with the treatment of hostile minorities in Western societies, comparison with the treatment of dissident minorities, comparison with the treatment of non-assimilating minorities, and comparison with the treatment of Jewish minorities.

1. *Hostile minorities.* Israeli Arabs belong to a special category of hostile or enemy-affiliated minorities. They are regarded as a security risk for being part of the belligerent Arab world (which now excludes Egypt) and Palestinians. Since Israel's right to national security is accepted, the question is whether Israeli Jews are less tolerant of Israeli Arabs than Westerners are tolerant of their own hostile minorities.

The treatment of enemy-affiliated minorities in the United States during World War Two is a case in point. Japanese Americans were treated as a fifth column, their civil rights were denied, and they were driven into relocation camps. Spokesmen for the Israeli government sometimes invoke this analogy to show that Israel, a country fighting for its very survival, does better in handling its hostile Arab minority. This comparison is, however, partial and one-sided. First, it is evident, in retrospect, that the Japanese Americans fell victim to needless injustice. Second, the United States did not mishandle the German and Italian minorities whose loyalty could have also been questioned. And third, the Israeli case is one of protracted conflict which necessitates policies of trust-building, and not the reinforcement of inter-group hostility.

Jewish mistrust of the Arab minority is excessive. The historical record does not countenance the widespread feeling that the Arabs as a whole are a security risk and that a sizeable number of them are actually involved in spying and terror, and hence the already inordinate surveillance over them should be further increased. Toledano (1974), then the Prime Minister's Advisor on Arab Affairs, is no doubt right in charging the Jewish public and private sector of hypersensitivity over national security as shown in their reluctance to employ Arabs who have passed security clearance in positions of trust.

2. *Dissident minorities.* Israeli Arabs belong to a special type of ideologically dissident minorities. They object to the Jewish consensus in two basic ways. They reject Israel's national ideology of Zionism and

her *raison d'être* as a Jewish-Zionist state. They also dissent from the Jewish view of the Israeli-Arab conflict, i.e. they support the solution of an independent PLO-headed, Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which is anathema to the Jewish public. Since Arabs are a dissident minority, it is possible to compare tolerance towards them with that towards dissident minorities in other Western democracies and towards other dissident groups in Israel.

There are striking similarities between the treatment of the dissidence of the Arabs in Israel and that of Catholics in Northern Ireland (Smooha, 1980). In both cases the majorities determine unilaterally the national consensus, oppose negotiation with the minorities on the terms and limits of the consensus, and regard the rejection of the consensus by the minorities as subversion and not as a legitimate dissent.

Several studies attest to the political intolerance of Jewish youths and adults in Israel. A cross-national study of the civic culture of students in elementary and high schools shows that political tolerance is lowest in Israel. To illustrate, 47% of the Israeli Jewish youths as against 32% of youths in Western Europe and the United States would give less rights to persons who hold views opposed to the regime. Similarly 46% and 20% respectively would deny equal rights to Communists (Lewy, Rapaport and Rimor, 1978:177). In Smooha's survey a third to a half of the Jewish adults denied various civil rights to 'critics of the regime' and 'groups opposed to Israel's Jewish-Zionist character.' Another comparative study concluded that political intolerance is high in Israel, higher than in the United States, intense, and focused in its target groups (Sullivan, Shamir, Roberts and Walsh, 1984). More specifically, it was found that 64% of the Israeli Jews, in a survey undertaken in 1980, selected PLO supporters and Rakah as their least liked groups (Shamir and Sullivan, 1983:918).

Since the disliked or dissenting groups happen to be overwhelmingly Arab, there is a considerable coincidence in Israel between political intolerance and intolerance of Israeli Arabs. For example, in Smooha's survey 22% of the Jews were in favour of prohibiting critics of the regime from holding demonstrations, of whom 82% were also in favour of imposing the same ban on Israeli Arabs.

It appears, therefore, that Arab dissidence figures largely in political intolerance of Jews towards Arabs. But even if Jewish intolerance of Arabs is not excessive when compared to that towards other dissidents in Israel, this would only 'explain' but not 'justify' it. If political democracy means a right to dissent, then Arabs as other ideological dissidents are entitled to avail themselves of the democratic procedures to change the regime.

3. *Non-assimilating minorities.* Israeli Arabs fall in the special category of non-assimilating minorities. They wish to preserve their separate identity, culture, institutions and communities and are assured the

necessary conditions to do so. The critical question is whether Israeli Arabs are treated in the same way as non-assimilating minorities in Western democracies and as Jews in Israel.

In a comparative perspective Israeli democracy has two structural weaknesses. Israel lacks the American constitution or the British tradition that provide for the protection of individual and minority rights (Shapira, 1977). It maintains instead the 1945 Emergency Regulations which can be easily misused to crack down on dissidents and unpopular minority groups. Neither does Israel have, on the mass level, a genuine democratic political culture. These failings account for the Jewish public's support for the ongoing control of Arabs in Israel and for the Arabs' failure to gain control over their separate institutions.

A more formidable obstacle to the full realization of Israeli democracy is the ethnic nature of the state. As a Jewish-Zionist state, Israel is constituted to be the country of all Jews living inside or outside Israel, and not of its citizens. It is supposed to keep a Jewish majority and to promote Jewish interests and institutions. These ideas militate against the full extension of democracy and equality to the Arab minority and to other non-Jews. Although Israel differs from other Western democracies by being ethnic, i.e. identified with one of its constituent ethnic groups, it is internationally recognized and legitimised as such.⁶

In view of these shortcomings in Israeli democracy, there is little wonder that the Jewish majority develops ethnocentric attitudes towards the Arabs. Lam (1983) argues that Israeli Jews have a nationalistic, rather than democratic, political culture. They hold that their rights, culture and identity are superior, and deserve better protection, than those of Israeli Arabs. They de-humanise Arabs and believe that force is the best means to deal with them.

Our findings clearly expose ethnocentric excesses among the Jews. Given the fact that Arabs and Jews share the goal of separate existence or coexistence, it is morally defensible for 93.5% of the Jews to object to intermarriage and even for a majority of them to oppose mixed schools or neighbourhoods. On the other hand, the same ultimate end provides no justification for the two-thirds who are unprepared to work as a subordinate to an Arab, let alone for the one-third who are not ready to work with any Arab.

The most crucial point hinges, however, on the unwarranted expectation of Jews to be treated preferentially. While the idea of a Jewish-Zionist state would sanction the Law of Return, Jewish state symbols and Jewish institutions, it would not necessarily validate the claims of half of the Jews who are indifferent or opposed to granting Arabs equal rights, 84% who endorse the principle of preferential treatment of Jews by the state and substantial proportions who favour the denial of equal treatment to Arabs in specific areas.

4. *Jewish minorities.* Four-fifths of the Jews in the world today still live as minorities in many countries, mostly in the West, but also in the Soviet Union, Latin America and Syria. As a Jewish state Israel sees itself responsible for them and defends their safety and rights as much as possible. The sensitivity and responsibility Israel feels towards Jewish minorities is a plausible standard for appraising its treatment of the Arab minority. As Weizman, Israel's first President, noted, Israel would be judged by its handling of the Arab minority.

Israel's Arabs do not enjoy the equal rights and opportunities afforded to the Jewish minorities in Western countries today. More indicative of Jewish ethnocentrism are, however, the data from Tsemah's survey that demonstrate that Israeli Jews apply double standards with regard to Arabs in Israel and Jews abroad. While only 13% justified the rejection from universities and workplaces of Russian Jews because of their anti-Soviet declarations or a wish to emigrate to Israel, 73% opposed the admission to universities of Israeli Arabs who publicly declare that they are dissatisfied with Israel's existence yet do not plot against it. In the same vein, only 9% of the Jews justified the historical ban on land sales to Jews in certain countries but 67% objected to the selling of lands in Israel's central region to Arabs. Furthermore, while preventive detention for national security reasons was condoned by 61% of the Jews in the survey when imposed on Arabs in Israel, it was condoned by only 17% in the case of Jews in Russia and by only 26% when applied to Jews in Egypt during the 1967 war.

Conclusion

Ethnocentrism is narrowly defined as superiority, mistrust, avoidance and unwillingness to grant equal rights and opportunities to an ethnic group beyond what is necessary to achieve legitimate collective goals. Even if these goals are identified in Israel as separate existence and equality, and for Jews also national security and the preservation of the Jewish-Zionist character of the state, there is clear evidence for the prevalence of a significant degree of ethnocentrism among both Arabs and Jews.

Since ethnocentrism in Israel, as in most cases, is not the outgrowth of interpersonal dislikes or prejudices but rather inherent in the social background of each group and in the structure of minority-majority relations, a question arises as to what extent it is reactive or genuine. Ethnocentrism is reactive if it is mostly a response to a given situation and especially if the situation is changeable, and it is genuine when it stems from the history or 'mentality' of the group or is anchored in intractable conditions. This distinction is hard to make in practice, but is invoked here as a way of offering concluding remarks on the complex question of ethnocentrism in Israel.

Israeli Arab ethnocentrism springs from two different sources, one of

which is the treatment Arabs actually receive in Israel. Jewish cultural dominance, institutional discrimination, rejection, extensive control and lack of accommodation with the Palestinians engender reactive ethnocentrism among Israeli Arabs. They overreact by stereotyping and distrusting Israeli Jews as a whole. The fact that the Arabs who are not on visiting terms with Jews, suffered from land expropriations and are dissatisfied with local services are more ethnocentric than other Arabs testifies to the centrality and vitality of this factor.

The other source of Arab ethnocentrism, which is of a genuine nature, relates to the semi-feudal, agrarian, religious and authoritarian origins of the Israeli Arab population. Despite extensive social change, there is still an appreciable degree of conservatism, familism, communalism and rejection of outsiders among Israeli Arabs. These predispositions are echoed in the finding that the Arabs who endorse traditional norms tend to be more ethnocentric than others. It seems, nevertheless, that the treatment of Arabs is, overall, a greater source of Arab ethnocentrism than Arab traditionalism. Hence Arab ethnocentrism appears to be mainly reactive and transformable.

In contrast, Jewish ethnocentrism looks both genuine and intractable. It feeds on a variety of sources, of which two can be considered situational - the Israeli-Arab conflict and the dissidence of the Arab minority. Both generate enormous mistrust among the Jews. The Arabs are perceived by Jews as a threat to the physical and normative integrity of Israeli society. But this perception is likely to change if progress could be made in the settlement of the Israeli-Arab dispute.

It seems, however, that the nature of Israel as a state is a more serious and enduring source of Jewish ethnocentrism. Two forces which are built into the very structure of the state encroach on its democratic regime: religion and Zionism. In Israel religion is not separated from the state. Orthodoxy, which is the least liberal of the three main streams in modern Judaism, is dominant. Alongside humanistic tenets, Israeli orthodoxy possesses centuries-old ethnocentric traditions, which enjoy certain legitimacy and impunity in a society where the majority and state power are Jewish. For instance, in 1986 some Rabbis, and even the man in charge of religious state schools ruled against contrived group encounters between Arab and Jewish school children. Furthermore, the religious political parties strongly opposed the enactment of a law against racism lest it run counter to certain Orthodox beliefs and practices.

Israeli Zionism is no doubt the strongest ethnocentric force. As a politically diverse national movement, Zionism has socialist and liberal currents, and it also enshrines democracy as an undisputed national goal. Its insistence, however, on preserving Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state and its failure to come to grips with the status of the Arab minority in such a state are a constant stimulus for Jewish ethnocentrism. The Jew in the street feels superior to his fellow Arab citizens, expects better

rights and treatment, regards Arabs as untrustworthy and subversive, and wishes to keep them in 'their place'. He draws from Zionism, as he understands it, and from many statements by some Israeli Jewish leaders, justification and reinforcement for these beliefs and feelings. For instance, 55% of the hawkish Jewish leaders in Smootha's survey said that Israel as a state should prefer Jews to Arabs (Table 12).

To conclude, the question of ethnocentrism in Israel extends far beyond matters of interpersonal prejudice and discrimination and hence cannot be dealt with through the dissemination of information and the promotion of interethnic contact. It rather involves the foundations of Israeli society: Zionism, Judaism, democracy, dissidence and the Israeli-Arab conflict. A fundamental re-evaluation of them will be required in order to effectively combat Arab and Jewish ethnocentrism.

Notes

1. The Arab part of the survey was based on a random, systematic and stratified sample taken from the all-inclusive voters' roll published by the Ministry of Interior. The sampling for the Jewish part was stratified according to localities, streets and households. The ecological method used for Jews was cheaper but less representative. The Jewish samples in both Tsemah's and Smootha's surveys were weighted according to age, education and ethnic origin in order to correct the demographic biases (the population parameters were derived from the 1980 labour force surveys).
2. Smootha's survey was funded by the Ford Foundation to which I am grateful. Tsemah's survey was sponsored by the Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation. I wish to thank Alouph Hareven for making the data of Tsemah's survey available to me.
3. The figures from Tsemah's survey differ slightly from those in the original report (Tsemah, 1980) because they were adjusted in this study for non-response and for sampling biases.
4. If not otherwise indicated, in this study 'Jews' mean 'Israeli Jews' and 'Arabs' mean 'Israeli Arabs' (within the Green Line). To avoid misunderstandings, the words 'Jews in Israel' and 'Arabs in Israel' were used in the questionnaires.
5. 64% of the Arabs in a survey taken in 1976 (Smootha, 1984) were not willing to have a Jew as one of two immediate neighbours and 64% of the Jews in the Tsemah's survey were not willing to live in a building with Arabs.
6. This legitimacy is reflected, among other things, in the 1947 United Nations Partition Resolution which is the legal basis for Israel's existence. This resolution, which was also supported by the Soviet bloc, provided for the creation of a Jewish state (a state for Jews) in part of Palestine.

References

- AMIR, YEHUDA. 1979 'Interpersonal contact between Arabs and Israelis', *The Jerusalem Quarterly* 13 (Fall): 3-17.
- HOFMAN, JOHN E. 1977 'Identity and intergroup perception in Israel', *International Journal of Inter-Cultural Relations* 1, 3: 79-102.
- HOFMAN, JOHN E. 1982. 'Social identity and the readiness for social relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel', *Human Relations* 35, 9: 727-41.
- KAHANE, MEIR 1981 *They Must Go*, New York: Grosset and Dunlap.
- LAM, ZVI 1983 'The status of a minority is determined by the political culture of the society', *Akhvah 1* (Spring): 9-12 (Hebrew).

- LANTERNARI, VITTORIO 1980 'Ethnocentrism and ideology', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 3, 1 (January): 52-66.
- LeVINE, ROBERT A. and DONALD T. CAMPBELL 1972 *Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes and Group Behavior*, New York: Wiley.
- LEWY, ARIEH, CHANAN RAPAPORT and MORDECHAI RIMOR 1978 *Educational Achievements in the Israeli School System: A Cross-National Comparative Study*, Tel Aviv: Ramot Educational Systems (Hebrew).
- LUSTICK, IAN 1980 *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority*, Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press.
- PERES, YOCHANAN 1971 'Ethnic relations in Israel', *American Journal of Sociology* 76, 6 (May): 1021-1047.
- PERES, YOCHANAN and ZIPPORA LEVY 1969. 'Jews and Arabs: Ethnic group stereotypes in Israel', *Race* 10, 4 (April): 479-492.
- RAPAPORT, CHANAN, MATATYAHU PELED, MORDECHAI RIMOR and CHAIM MANO 1978 *Arab Youth in Israel: Knowledge, Values and Behavior in the Social and Political Spheres*, Research Report No. 211, Publication No. 594 (Mimeographed), Jerusalem: Szold Institute (Hebrew).
- ROBINS, EDWARD, A 1972 'Attitudes, stereotypes and prejudice among Arabs and Jews in Israel', *New Outlook* 15, 9 (November-December): 36-48.
- SHAMIR, MICHAL and JOHN SULLIVAN 1983 'The political context of tolerance: the United States and Israel', *The American Political Science Review* 77, 6 (December): 911-928.
- SHAPIRA, YONATHAN 1977 *Democracy in Israel*, Ramat Gan: Massada (Hebrew).
- SMOOHA, SAMMY 1980 'Control of minorities in Israel and Northern Ireland', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22, 2 (April): 256-280.
- SMOOHA, SAMMY 1984 *The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel*, Haifa: The Jewish-Arab Center, University of Haifa.
- SMOOHA, SAMMY (Forthcoming) *Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel: The 1980 Survey*, Haifa: The Jewish-Arab Center, University of Haifa.
- SULLIVAN, JOHN, MICHAL SHAMIR, NIGEL ROBERTS and PATRICK WALSH 1984 'Political intolerance and the structure of mass attitudes: a study of the United States, Israel and New Zealand', *Comparative Political Studies* 17, 3 (October): 319-344.
- SUMNER, W. G. 1906 *Folkways*, New York: Ginn.
- TOLEDANO, SHMUEL 1974 Interviews, *Ma'ariv* November 22. (Hebrew).
- TSEMAH, MINA 1980 *The Attitudes of the Jewish Majority towards the Arab Minority in Israel*, Interim Report (Mimeographed), Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation (Hebrew).
- ZUREIK, ELIA T. 1979 *The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.